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This paper uses the framework in Wolak (2003a,b and 2007) and data on half-hourly offer curves and 
market-clearing prices and quantities from the New Zealand wholesale electricity market over the 
period January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007 to characterize how the four large suppliers in this imperfectly 
competitive industry exercise market power. To accomplish this we introduce half-hourly measures of 
the firm-level ability and incentive of an individual supplier to exercise unilateral market power that 
are derived from a simplified model of expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour in a multi-unit 
auction market. We then show that half-hourly market-clearing prices are highly correlated with the 
half-hourly values of the firm-level and firm-average measures of both the ability and incentive of the 
four large suppliers in New Zealand to exercise market power. We then present evidence consistent 
with the view that this increasing relationship between the ability or incentive of individual suppliers 
to exercise market power and higher market-clearing prices is caused by the four large suppliers 
submitting higher offer prices when they have a greater ability or incentive to exercise unilateral 
market power. We show that after controlling for changes in input fossil fuel prices and other factors 
that impact the opportunity cost of producing electricity during that half hour, each of the four 
suppliers submits a higher offer price into the wholesale market when it has a greater ability or 
incentive to exercise unilateral market power. To strengthen the case that this increasing relationship 
between market prices and the ability and incentive of each of the suppliers to exercise unilateral 
market power is actually caused by the four large suppliers exercising unilateral market power by 
changing their offer prices in response to their ability and incentive to exercise market power, we also 
perform a test of the implications of the null hypothesis that the four large suppliers behave as if they 
had no ability to exercise market power. We find strong evidence against this null hypothesis and 
instead find that these hypothesis testing results are consistent with the perspective that these suppliers 
are exercising all available unilateral market power. 
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
Empirical examination of the implications of profit-maximizing firm behaviour in imperfectly 
competitive markets is complicated by the fact that the primitives of the economic environment, such 
as market demand functions and firm-level cost functions, are not directly observable. Moreover, the 
researcher rarely knows the strategic variables that firms use to influence market prices or often even 
the details of how market prices are set. As a result, researchers rely on parametric models of market 
demand and firm-level cost functions and equilibrium models of strategic interaction such as non-
cooperative quantity-setting or price-setting behaviour to understand how firms behave in imperfectly 
competitive markets. Consequently, any conclusions about firm behaviour or the extent of market 
power exercised are conditional on these functional form assumptions and the assumed model of 
strategic interaction between firms. 
We pursue an alternative approach that relies on a data-rich environment where many of these 
economic primitives are observable and both the strategic variables that firms choose and the exact 
mechanism that translates these strategic variables into market-clearing prices are known. This 
economic environment allows us to examine many implications of expected profit-maximizing 
behaviour in imperfectly competitive markets without relying on functional form assumptions for 
market demand or a specific model of strategic interaction among firms. 
To understand the advantages of the approach we pursue, it is useful to review the traditional 
approach from the perspective of the rapidly expanding literature in what Bresnahan (1989) calls the 
new empirical industrial organization. This approach uses market-clearing prices and quantities and 
variables assumed to shift demand and production costs along with three economic and behavioural 
assumptions to recover estimates of the extent of market power exercised in an imperfectly 
competitive market. 
The three main econometric and behavioural assumptions necessary for validity of the traditional 
approach are: (1) parametric functional forms for the market demand and firm-level or market-level 
variable cost functions, (2) a model of firm-level strategic interaction, such as monopoly, quantity-
setting competition, or price-setting competition, and (3) profit-maximizing or expected profit-
maximizing behaviour. Using a cross-section of monopoly newspaper markets, Rosse (1970) was the 
first to demonstrate that the combination of these three assumptions can allow a researcher to recover 
the firm’s marginal cost function from market-clearing prices and quantities and demand and cost 
shifters. The results of this modeling effort can then be used to estimate the marginal cost of the 
highest cost unit of output produced by the firm. This marginal cost equals the market-clearing price if 
the firm were unable to exercise any market power. Consequently, the difference between the market 
price and this estimated marginal cost measures the extent of market power exercised. 
Porter (1984) applied this basic approach to an oligopolistic industry—19
th century railroads. He 
assumed that actual market outcomes are the result of non-cooperative quantity-setting behaviour 
between market participants. Bresnahan (1981 and 1987) measures the extent of market power 
exercised in the United States automobile industry by specifying a parametric discrete choice model of 
automobile demand at the individual household level that he aggregates to obtain market demand 
curves for each product sold. He then assumes that industry outcomes are the result of non-cooperative 
(in Bresnahan (1987) cooperative) price-setting by the major automobile suppliers. By specifying 
functional forms for variable cost functions for each product, Bresnahan achieves an econometric 
model of aggregate demand and product-level cost functions that can be estimated from data on 
market-clearing prices and quantities to measure the extent of market power exercised in this industry. 
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2001) extend this basic approach to measuring 
market power in a number of important directions, although both papers follow the same general 
approach as Bresnahan. A parametric model of demand at the consumer level is assumed and Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
2 
aggregated across individuals to obtain product-level market demand functions. The assumption of 
non-cooperative expected profit-maximizing price-setting behaviour (Bertrand competition) and 
parametric assumptions for product-level cost functions are employed to estimate the parameters of 
the demand and cost functions that can be used to measure the extent of market power exercised. 
Goldberg (1995) follows a slightly different approach by estimating an econometric model of 
household-level demand. She then aggregates these household-level demand functions to obtain 
market demand functions. The assumption of non-cooperative price-setting expected profit-
maximizing behaviour by firms is then employed to estimate the parameters of the product level cost 
functions and quantify the extent of market power exercised. 
All of these studies and many more recent ones employing these techniques rely on an assumed 
parametric model of demand and a model of competition among firms to derive an estimate of the 
extent of market power exercised from market-clearing price and quantity data. As has been 
emphasized by a number of authors, most forcefully by Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983), the estimate of 
the extent of market power exercised depends on the functional form assumed for the market demand. 
The assumed model of competition can also exert a substantial influence on the estimate of the extent 
of market power exercised. The most stark example of this result is the difference in the estimated 
extent of market power exercised resulting from assuming price-setting Bertrand competition in a 
homogenous-product constant-marginal-cost oligopoly versus quantity-setting competition in this 
same economic environment. The former will produce marginal-cost pricing, whereas the latter will 
achieve prices with significant markups over the marginal cost of the highest cost unit produced that 
depends on the number of firms and elasticity of the market demand. 
All of these studies quantifying the extent of market power exercised do not explicitly address the 
question of how firms exercise market power, specifically what factors determine the extent of market 
power that firms are able to exercise and the amount of market power they choose to exercise. Because 
the amount of market power exercised is identified from market-clearing prices and quantities (and 
demand and cost shifters) using the functional form assumed for demand and the assumed model of 
competition among firms, any conclusions about how firms exercise market power or what factors 
enhance their ability and incentive to exercise market power are conditional on these two assumptions. 
Taking the example of an oligopoly model with the market demand based on individual discrete 
choices among products differentiated by observed and unobserved characteristics, a conclusion that 
certain values of the product characteristics are associated with larger amounts of market power being 
exercised is conditional on the assumed functional form for the underlying demand curves and 
assumptions about the form of strategic interaction among firms. Moreover, as Bresnahan (1987) 
demonstrates in his comparison of product-level versus firm-level price-setting competition, even for 
the same functional forms for market demands and production costs, assuming a different model of 
competition can lead to substantially different conclusions about the extent of market power exercised. 
The recent world-wide trend toward introducing bid-based wholesale electricity markets has 
created an increasing number of data-rich economic environments where it is possible to study how 
firms behave in imperfectly competitive markets using only the assumption of expected profit-
maximizing behaviour. Participants in these multi-unit auction markets submit their willingness-to-sell 
or willingness-to-purchase curves to the market operator and these curves are used to compute market-
clearing prices and the quantities bought and sold by each market participant. A willingness-to-sell or 
willingness-to-buy curve gives the amount of the good a market participant is willing to sell or buy for 
each possible market-clearing price. If the researcher is willing to assume that a supplier constructs its 
willingness-to-supply curve to maximize the expected profits that it earns given the offers of its 
competitors and the bids of demanders, then it is possible to infer a supplier’s variable cost function 
from the bid and offer curves that it and its market participants submit without having to resort 
functional form assumptions for aggregate demand or an assumed model of competition among firms. 
This result follows by the same logic as described above. For the case of a multi-unit auction 
market, the offers submitted by other suppliers besides the supplier under consideration and the bids of How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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all demanders determine the realized residual demand curve faced by that supplier. For the case that 
the researcher only has data on market-clearing prices and quantities, the residual demand curve a 
supplier faces is determined by the functional form assumption for aggregate demand and an assumed 
model of competition among firms. Because a supplier does not know the offers of other suppliers or 
all demand bids at the time it submits its willingness-to-supply curve, this supplier must construct its 
offer curve to maximize the expected profits that it expects to earn given the distribution of residual 
demand curves that it faces. Wolak (2003a) demonstrates that the assumption that the supplier chooses 
the form of its offer curve to maximize its expected profits given the distribution of residual demand 
curves that it faces identifies that supplier’s marginal cost function. 
Wolak (2003a) applies this logic to a multi-unit auction market for wholesale electricity to estimate 
generation unit-level variable cost-functions without the first two assumptions described above. The 
information contained in the offer curves submitted by all market participants and the assumption of 
expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour by the supplier under consideration are sufficient to 
estimate generation unit-level marginal cost functions for a supplier. Wolak (2007) extends this cost 
function estimation framework to the case of multivariate cost functions in order to quantify the extent 
to which marginal costs for a specific generation unit in a given half-hour of the day vary with the 
level of output during that half-hour and during other half-hours of the day. Wolak (2003b) shows that 
the information contained in the offer curves and demand bids can also be used to compute a measure 
of the ability of a supplier to exercise unilateral market power. 
This paper uses the framework in Wolak (2003a,b and 2007) and data on half-hourly offer curves 
and market-clearing prices and quantities from the New Zealand wholesale electricity market over the 
period January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007 to characterize how the four large suppliers in this imperfectly 
competitive industry exercise market power. To accomplish this we introduce half-hourly measures of 
the firm-level ability and incentive of an individual supplier to exercise unilateral market power that 
are derived from a model of expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour in a multi-unit auction 
market. We then show that half-hourly market-clearing prices are highly correlated with the half-
hourly values of the firm-level and firm-average measures of both the ability and incentive of the four 
large suppliers in New Zealand to exercise market power. 
We then present evidence consistent with the view that this increasing relationship between the 
ability or incentive of individual suppliers to exercise market power and higher market-clearing prices 
is caused by the four large suppliers submitting higher offer prices when they have a greater ability or 
incentive to exercise unilateral market power. We show that after controlling for changes in input 
fossil fuel prices and other factors that impact the opportunity cost of producing electricity during that 
half hour, each of the four suppliers submits a higher offer price into the wholesale market when it has 
a greater ability or incentive to exercise unilateral market power. 
This analysis considers alternative half-hourly measures of both the incentive and ability of each of 
the four large suppliers to exercise unilateral market power and finds a similar increasing relationship 
between a greater ability or incentive to exercise unilateral market power and a higher offer price by 
that supplier into the wholesale market. For all measures of the ability and incentive of a supplier to 
exercise market power we find that our regression coefficient estimates imply economically significant 
changes in a supplier’s half-hourly offer prices for changes in the half-hourly value of both the ability 
and incentive of that supplier to exercise market power that occur routinely during our sample period. 
To strengthen the case that this increasing relationship between market prices and the ability and 
incentive of each of the suppliers to exercise unilateral market power is actually caused by the four 
large suppliers exercising unilateral market power by changing their offer prices in response to their 
ability and incentive to exercise market power, we also perform a test of the implications of the null 
hypothesis that the four large suppliers behave as if they had no ability to exercise market power. We 
find strong evidence against this null hypothesis and instead find that these hypothesis testing results Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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are consistent with the perspective that these suppliers are exercising all available unilateral market 
power. 
These empirical results lead to the following conclusions about the behaviour of the four large 
suppliers in the New Zealand wholesale electricity market. First, these suppliers are successful at 
increasing market-clearing prices by raising their offer prices into the wholesale market when they 
have a greater ability to exercise unilateral market power. Second, even though an individual supplier 
may have a substantial ability to exercise unilateral market power, it may not in fact exercise this 
market power because it has no incentive to do so. However, when a supplier with the ability to 
exercise unilateral market power also has the incentive to do so, we show that it can do this by either 
raising or lowering its offer price and therefore the market-clearing price, depending on its fixed-price 
forward market commitments relative to the amount of energy it sells into the short-term market. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the 
New Zealand wholesale electricity market. Section 3 introduces a simplified model of expected profit-
maximizing offer behaviour in a bid-based wholesale electricity market that forms the basis for our 
measures of the ability of a supplier to exercise market power. We then extend this model to the case 
that the supplier has fixed-price forward contract obligations. This model forms the basis for our 
measure of the incentive of a supplier to exercise unilateral market power. Section 4 discusses how our 
measures of the ability and incentive of suppliers to exercise market power are constructed from half-
hourly offer and demand data and relates these half-hourly measures to the half-hourly values of 
market-clearing prices from the New Zealand wholesale electricity market over our sample period. 
Section 5 present the results of our empirical analysis relating half-hourly offer prices to half-hourly 
values of that supplier’s half-hourly ability or incentive to exercise unilateral market power, after 
controlling for factors that determine variable cost differences for that suppliers across half-hours of 
the sample period. Section 6 presents the results of our analysis using alternative measures of the firm-
level ability and incentive of suppliers to exercise unilateral market power. Section 7 presents the 
results of our test of the null hypothesis that some of the large suppliers behave as if they had no 
ability to exercise unilateral market power. Section 8 closes with a discussion of the lessons this 
analysis of how firms exercise unilateral market power has for other electricity markets and other 
oligopoly markets. 
2. The New Zealand Wholesale Electricity Market 
In October 1996, a wholesale electricity market was formed by the New Zealand electricity supply 
industry. This market was a contract between market participants—generation unit owners, retailers, 
and energy traders—that specified how generation units were dispatched and wholesale prices were 
determined. 
Prior to the start of the wholesale market, the transmission and generation sectors were dominated 
by the state-owned Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (“ECNZ”), which owned and operated 
more than 95% of the total New Zealand electricity generating capacity. ECNZ was broken up in three 
stages. First, in July 1994, the national transmission grid was separated into a stand-alone State-
Owned Enterprise (“SOE”) Transpower. In February 1996, before the start of the wholesale electricity 
market, Contact Energy was formed out of ECNZ generation assets that represented roughly 22% of 
total electricity production. Contact was a stand-alone SOE in competition with ECNZ until it was 
privatized in 1999. Finally, about the same time as the privatization of Contact, the remainder of 
ECNZ was split into three competing SOEs: Genesis, Meridian and Mighty River Power. All three 
firms, as well as Transpower, remain state-owned. 
In response to a perceived lack of competition in both the wholesale and retail markets, the 
Government announced a series of reforms of the electricity supply industry in April 1998. In addition 
to the final split of ECNZ, these reforms included the forced separation of distribution and retailing How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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businesses. At the time there were more than 40 distribution firms, each with a very high market share 
in retailing for customers on their networks. The separation of distribution and retail led to rapid 
vertical integration between the generation and retail sectors, as Contact Energy and the newly-formed 
SOE generators bought the retail businesses from the network owners. Two new privately-owned 
generation and retail firms were created out of the industry reorganization—TransAlta New Zealand 
and TrustPower—although the former firm disintegrated in 2001. 
Since 2001 the industry market structure has been relatively stable. There are five major generation 
owners: Contact, TrustPower, and the three SOEs, Genesis, Meridian and Mighty River Power. Each 
of these generation owners is vertically integrated with a retail business serving a mix of residential, 
commercial and industrial users. With the exception of TrustPower, all of these firms have more 
generation capacity than their average retail load obligation, although there are half-hours during our 
sample period when each of these retailers has retail load obligations that exceed their sales in the 
short-term market.  
As of mid-2007, the installed capacity of the New Zealand market is approximately 9050 MW. 
Meridian owns 2642 MW in hydroelectric and wind capacity. Contact is the second largest generation 
owner with 2287 MW of gas-fired, geothermal and hydroelectric generation units. Genesis owns 1886 
MW of capacity, including the combination gas and coal-fired Huntly power station and 500 MW of 
hydroelectric capacity. Mighty River Power owns 1295 MW of a combination of hydroelectric, 
geothermal and natural gas-fired capacity. Trustpower owns 452 MW of hydroelectric and wind 
capacity. The remaining 488 MW of generation capacity is owned by a number of small firms, none of 
them with more than 120 MW of capacity. 
The New Zealand electricity system consists of two alternating current subsystems, for the North 
and South Islands, connected by a 610 km (including 40 km submarine) High Voltage Direct Current 
(“HVDC”) cable between the largest hydroelectric scheme in the South Island and the Wellington 
region in the North Island. The maximum total power transfer capability is currently 1040 MW from 
south to north, the direction of flows for the majority of half-hour periods of the year, and 
approximately 600 MW from north to south. Hydroelectric energy availability in the South Island is 
the major determinant of the direction and level of energy flows. 
More than 99% of the energy produced in the South Island comes from hydroelectric sources. 
There is sufficient generation capacity in the South Island to serve its annual electricity requirements, 
as well as export a substantial amount of energy to the North Island using the HVDC cable. 
Approximately 24.4% of the North Island supply came from hydroelectric sources in 2007, with the 
remaining 75.6% split between natural gas-fired (44.6%), coal-fired (11.6%), geothermal (13.0%), 
wind (3.4%), wood (2.1%), and less than 1% from biogas facilities.  
Annual electricity consumption for the entire country in the year ending December 2007 was 
approximately 38.5 Terawatt hours (TWh), with the commercial sector consuming 23.3% of this total, 
the industrial sector 43.7%, and the residential sector 33.0%. An important aspect of the New Zealand 
electricity industry is that much of the population resides in the northern part of the North Island in the 
Auckland metropolitan area, whereas many of the major hydroelectric resources are in the southern 
part of the South Island. As a result, transmission and distribution accounts for a relatively large 
fraction of the cost of delivered electricity compared to the rest of the world. 
3. The Unilateral Market Power Problem in Wholesale Electricity Markets 
This section introduces the economic theory underlying the measures used in our empirical work of 
the ability and incentive of a supplier in a multi-unit auction-based wholesale electricity market to 
exercise market power. All of these measures depend on the half-hourly willingness-to-supply curves 
of all producers and the level of half-hourly demand. Before proceeding with this discussion, we first Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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define unilateral market power and why exercising all available unilateral market power is equivalent 
to a privately-owned firm serving its fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders. 
A market participant is said to possess market power if it can take unilateral actions to influence the 
market price and to profit from the resulting price change. The demand side of most electricity 
markets is composed of many small buyers and the supply side is typically composed of a small 
number of large sellers. It is also relatively straightforward for a large supplier to withhold output from 
the short-term market, whereas it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a large demander to do 
this unless it curtails the consumption of the retail customers that it serves. Consequently, the primary 
market power concern in wholesale electricity markets is from suppliers taking actions to influence 
market prices.  
It is important to emphasize that a supplier exercising all available unilateral market power subject 
to obeying the market rules is equivalent to that supplier taking all legal actions to maximize the 
profits it earns from participating in the wholesale market. Moreover, a firm’s management has a 
fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders to take all legal actions to maximize the profits it earns from 
participating in the wholesale market. Consequently, a firm is only serving its fiduciary responsibility 
to its shareholders when it exercises all available unilateral market power subject to obeying the 
wholesale market rules. 
3.1. Measuring the Ability to Exercise Unilateral Market Power in Bid-Based Markets 
A supplier to an auction-based wholesale electricity market submits a willingness-to-supply or offer 
curve which is composed of a series of offer steps for each pricing period. The length of the step 
specifies an incremental quantity of energy to be supplied and the height of the step is the price at 
which the supplier is willing to sell that quantity. The New Zealand market has 48 half-hourly pricing 
periods each day and suppliers are allowed to submit different price and quantity steps for their offer 
curves in each half-hour of the day. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the final offer curves submitted by Firm A and Firm B for a peak half-
hour period in February 2006. For the lowest-priced offer step, Firm A is willing to supply 920 MW at 
$0.03/MWh and if the market price increases to $60/MWh, it is willing to supply an additional 430 
MW, and so on. As the offer price increases, the supplier’s cumulative willingness to sell electricity 
increases along with the offer price, from 920MW at $0.03/MWh to 1,350MW at $60/MWh (= 
920MW at $0.03/MWh + 430 MW at $60/MWh). This increasing relationship between the offer price 
and the supplier’s cumulative willingness to sell yields the upward sloping offer curves for each 
supplier shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Let Sk(p) denote the offer curve of supplier k. At each price, p, 
this function gives the total quantity of energy that supplier k is willing to sell. 
The offer curves from each supplier can be used to construct the aggregate offer curve for any set 
of suppliers. This is done by calculating the cumulative quantity that the set of suppliers are willing to 
supply across the relevant range of prices. Let S123(p) equal the aggregate offer curve for firms 1, 2, 
and 3. In terms the individual offer curves, S123(p) = S1(p) + S2(p) + S3(p), which means that S123(p) at 
price p is equal to total amount of energy that firms 1,2, and 3 are willing to supply at price p. Figure 
3.3 shows the aggregate offer curve for Firm A and Firm B for the firm-level offer curves shown in 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2. At a price of $200/MWh, for example, Firm A is willing to supply a total of 1,650 
MW and Firm B is willing to supply 835 MW. Therefore, the aggregate offer of both firms at a price 
of $200/MWh is 2,485 MW. 
Given the offer curves of all generation units in New Zealand, the price each generation unit 
receives for its output and each buyer pays for its withdrawals is determined by minimizing the as-
offered cost of serving actual demand at all locations in the country. The as-offered cost for each 
generation unit is equal to the offer price times the offer quantity for each quantity increment or partial 
quantity increment accepted to provide energy summed over all offer price levels for that generation How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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unit. The total as-offered cost of serving load in New Zealand is the as-offered cost for each generation 
unit summed over all units in the country. The total of all offer quantities accepted by M-co to produce 
energy is equal to the total demand at all locations in the transmission network plus total transmission 
losses. The market price at each location in the transmission network is equal to the increase in the 
minimized value of the total as-offered cost of serving system demand at all locations in New Zealand 
as a result of an additional 1 MWh of load at that location.  
This methodology for determining prices at each location in the transmission network is called 
locational marginal pricing and is discussed in detail in Bohn, Caramanis, and Schweppe (1984). 
These locational marginal prices (LMPs) or nodal prices differ across locations in the transmission 
network because of transmission losses and transmission congestion. For locations far from generation 
units, more energy must be injected by distant generation units in order to withdraw an additional 1 
MWh from this location because of greater lines losses in transferring the electricity from the point of 
injection to the point of withdrawal. In contrast, for locations close to generation units, the nodal price 
is lower because the electricity withdrawn at that location does not travel as far. Congestion in the 
transmission network arises when the amount of electricity that suppliers on one side of a transmission 
link would like to inject leads to flows on the transmission link that exceed its capacity. In these 
circumstances, prices on one side of the link must be reduced to lower the flows on the transmission 
line to its capacity and prices on the other side of the link must be increased to ensure that there is 
sufficient local generation to serve demand given the actual flows of the transmission link into the 
area. 
Transmission congestion in the New Zealand wholesale market, as measured by the number of 
half-hours with price differences between locations that are greater than can be explained by line 
losses, is very infrequent. Line losses also tend to produce persistent price differences across locations 
in New Zealand because generation-rich nodes (those with low loss factors) and generation-poor 
nodes (those with high loss factors) within each island tend to remain so regardless of the level of 
demand throughout New Zealand.  
Consequently, during the periods when no transmission constraints are binding, the price at each 
location in New Zealand is well-approximated by taking the aggregate willingness-to-supply curve 
across all locations in New Zealand and solving for the price where this curve intersects the total 
demand in New Zealand. Define S(p) as the aggregate willingness-to-supply curve for a half-hour. It is 
equal to S1(p) + S2(p) + ..+ SK(p), where K is the total number of suppliers in New Zealand. Let QD = 
QD1 + QD2 + …QDM, where QDm is the actual real-time demand at node m and M is the total number 
of nodes in New Zealand. 
This no-congestion market-clearing price is the solution in p to the equation S(p) = QD. An 
example of this process is shown in Figure 3.4 for the same half-hour period as in Figures 3.1 to 3.3. 
In the period, the total market demand is 4,400 MW and based on the aggregated offer curve for all the 
suppliers, the market price has to be at least $120/MWh for there to be enough supply offers to meet 
this demand. 
This description of the price-setting process in the New Zealand market allows a graphical 
description of how suppliers exercise unilateral market power in a bid-based wholesale market, which 
motivates our measure of the ability of a supplier to exercise unilateral market power. As we discuss 
below, the basic intuition and insights provided by this single-price, graphical analysis carry over to 
the case of the nodal price-setting process used in the New Zealand market. To analyze the bidding 
behaviour of an individual supplier using this graphical framework, the above mechanism can be 
reformulated in terms of the supplier’s own offer curve, the offers of other suppliers and the total 
market demand. Specifically, the price setting equation S(p) = QD can be re-written as: 
S1(p) + S2(p) + ..+ SK(p) = QD. Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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Suppose that we are interested in measuring the ability of supplier j to exercise unilateral market 
power. This price-setting equation can be re-written as: 
 
Sj(p) = QD – (S1(p) + S2(p) + ...+ Sj-1(p) + Sj+1(p) + ...+ SK(p)) = QD – SOj(p), 
where SOj(p) is the aggregate willingness-to-supply curve of all firms besides supplier j. Define 
DRj(p) = QD – SOj(p) as the residual demand curve facing supplier j. The residual demand of supplier 
j at price p is defined as the market demand remaining to be served by supplier j after the willingness 
to supply curves of all other firms besides supplier j have been subtracted out. 
Figure 3.5 provides a graphical version of the above calculation of the residual demand for Firm A 
in the same half-hour period. The total market demand is 4,400MW and the total quantity offered by 
all suppliers other than Firm A is 3,350MW at $300 and 2,560MW at $50. Therefore, Firm A’s 
residual demand at $300 is 1,050MW (the market demand of 4,400MW minus 3,350MW of supply by 
other generators at that price). Its residual demand at $50 is 1,840MW (the market demand of 
4,400MW minus 2,560MW of supply by other generators at that price). Figure 3.6 shows the residual 
demand curve resulting from performing this calculation for all possible prices for Firm A in this half-
hour period. 
Figure 3.7 combines Firm A’s residual demand curve from Figure 3.6 with Firm A’s offer curve 
from Figure 3.1. Because this is a half-hour period with no transmission congestion, nodal prices differ 
across locations in New Zealand only because of line losses, which implies small differences between 
nodal prices across most locations in the New Zealand. If pm is price at node m and qm is the amount of 
energy injected at node m, the quantity-weighted average nodal price is the sum of the product of the 
nodal price and nodal quantity of energy injected over all M locations in New Zealand divided by the 
sum of the nodal injections at all locations in New Zealand during that half-hour. Mathematically, this 
quantity weighted average price p(avg), is equal to 
. 
Applying this process to all of the nodal prices for this half-hour period yields a quantity-weighted 
average price of $120/MWh. 
The residual demand curve that a supplier faces summarizes its ability to impact the market price 
through changes in its offer curve, holding the offer curves of other suppliers constant. This residual 
demand curve also gives the quantity of energy that the offer curves submitted by the firm’s 
competitors allow it to sell at each possible price. A firm can choose to produce any price and 
generation quantity pair along its residual demand curve. For example, Figure 3.8 shows the residual 
demand curve for Firm A calculated above. The realized price was $120/MWh and the quantity 
supplied by Firm A was 1,500MW, which gives Firm A generation revenues of $90,000 in the half-
hour. However, if Firm A had reduced the amount of energy it supplied by 15 percent to 1,270 MW, 
this would have increased the market price to $250/MWh. This price and quantity combination yields 
generation revenue of $158,750, even though Firm A supplies less energy to the wholesale market at 
this substantially higher price. 
As shown in Figure 3.8, Firm A could have increased the market price by 108% with a reduction in 
its quantity supplied of 15%. We define the ratio of the potential percentage increase in market price to 
the percentage reduction in quantity supplied as the inverse elasticity of the residual demand curve. In 
this case the inverse elasticity is 108/15 = 7.2. Higher values of the inverse elasticity mean that the 
supplier has greater ability to unilaterally change the market price. How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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As noted above, a supplier’s residual demand curve gives the set of feasible price/quantity pairs 
that it can choose from to maximize its profits. Firms in imperfectly competitive markets often speak 
of “pricing to take what competition gives them” or “pricing at what the market will bear.” These 
statements can be interpreted as the firm choosing the price/quantity pair along its residual demand 
curve that maximizes its profits. In this sense, a supplier’s residual demand curve shows the trade-off 
between a higher system price and lower generation quantity for the supplier because of supply 
responses of its competitors. The supplier maximizes profits by producing at the output level where 
the marginal revenue associated with selling an additional MWh equals the marginal cost associated 
with producing an additional unit. For the residual demand curve and marginal cost curve in Figure 
3.9, a profit-maximizing firm will supply a quantity Q1, the output level at the point of intersection of 
the marginal cost and marginal revenue curves. Note that the system price will be P1, the intersection 
of quantity Q1 with the residual demand curve. Note that this price exceeds the firm’s marginal cost of 
supplying Q1. The firm’s profits are given by the area left of Q1, below P1 and above the marginal cost 
curve. 
Figure 3.10 repeats the process of computing the profit-maximizing level of output for a flatter 
residual demand curve and the same marginal cost curve as in Figure 3.9. A profit-maximizing 
supplier will produce the quantity Q2 at a price of P2. Note that the difference between P2 and the 
marginal cost of production at Q2 is smaller than this same magnitude in Figure 3.9, which is a result 
of the flatter or more elastic residual demand curve in Figure 3.10. The case of a perfectly elastic 
residual demand curve is shown in Figure 3.11. This residual demand curve is the result of a flat 
aggregate offer curve of all other suppliers besides supplier j, which implies that there were many 
other firms willing to supply the entire market at the price P3 in Figure 3.11. For this residual demand 
curve, the marginal revenue curve coincides with the residual demand curve, because producing an 
additional unit of output has no effect on the market price. The firm will produce at the point of 
intersection of its marginal cost curve with its residual demand curve, which is the output level Q3 and 
price P3 in Figure 3.11. 
This example demonstrates the very important point that if a supplier faces a sufficiently elastic 
residual demand curve, typically because there is a large number of independent suppliers competing 
to sell energy at close to the same price, then it is unilaterally profit-maximizing for this supplier to 
produce at the point where the market price is equal to its marginal cost. As we demonstrate below, the 
firm accomplishes this by submitting an offer curve that is equal to its marginal cost curve, because 
the intersection of this offer curve with its residual demand curve produces the desired price/quantity 
pair. 
The examples in Figures 3.9 and 3.10 demonstrate that when a profit-maximizing supplier faces an 
upward sloping residual demand curve, the firm will find it unilaterally profit-maximizing to produce 
at an output level that is below the output level at the point of intersection of its marginal cost curve 
with its residual demand curve. In Figure 3.9, the firm would optimally offer only Q1 into the market, 
even though the price P1 greatly exceeds its marginal cost at that level of production. The firm 
accomplishes this by submitting an offer curve that lies above its marginal cost curve—that is, an offer 
curve with an offer price for that level of output above the marginal cost of producing that output. 
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 demonstrate that the difference between the supplier’s profit-maximizing offer 
price and the supplier’s marginal cost will be greater when the inverse elasticity of the residual 
demand curve is larger. This is an important implication of expected profit-maximizing behaviour that 
will be explored in subsequent sections of this paper. 
3.2. A Simplified Model of Expected Profit-Maximizing Offer Behaviour 
All of the examples presented thus far have assumed the residual demand curve is known when the 
supplier computes its profit-maximizing output level. Because a supplier’s residual demand curve is 
composed of the offer curves of its competitors and the market rules require all suppliers to submit Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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their offers at the same time, this assumption is not in fact true. However, the economic justification 
for using the inverse elasticity of a supplier’s residual demand curve as a measure of its ability to 
exercise unilateral market power carries over to the case that suppliers do not observe the actual 
residual demand curve they face at the time they submit their offers to the wholesale market.  
Although a supplier does not know with certainty the market demand and the willingness-to-supply 
offers of other suppliers when it submits its offers for the pricing period, the supplier does have a very 
good idea of the set possible realizations of the residual demand curves it might face. The 
characteristics of each generation unit owned by the supplier’s competitors and the market rules can 
significantly constrain the set of offers curves a supplier can submit. For example, the New Zealand 
markets rules specify a maximum number of quantity and price steps for each generation unit that 
owner can submit in their offer curve. The maximum value of the sum of these quantity steps must be 
less than the capacity of the generation unit. Producers are able change their willingness-to-supply 
functions up to 2 hours before the trading period, so there is likely to be very little uncertainty in 
system demand at the time they submit their final willingness-to-supply offers. All of these factors 
imply that the supplier has a very good idea of the set of possible realizations of the residual demand 
curve it might face. For each possible residual demand curve realization the supplier can find the ex 
post profit-maximizing market price and output quantity pair given its marginal cost curve following 
the process described above. This is the market price and output quantity pair that the supplier would 
like to achieve for that residual demand curve realization. 
Figure 3.12 illustrates the construction of an expected profit-maximizing willingness to supply 
curve using this process for the case of two possible residual demand curve realizations. For each 
residual demand curve realization, intersect the marginal cost curve with the marginal revenue curve 
associated with that residual demand curve realization. For example, for Residual Demand Curve 1 the 
marginal revenue curve for this residual demand curve (not shown on the figure) intersects the 
marginal cost curve at the quantity Q1. The output price associated with this output level on Residual 
Demand Curve 1 is P1. Repeating this process for Residual Demand Curve 2 yields the profit-
maximizing price and quantity pair (P2,Q2). Note that because both residual demand curves are very 
steeply sloped, there is a substantial difference between the market price and the marginal cost at each 
output level. If these two residual demand realizations were the only ones faced the supplier, it would 
submit an offer curve that passes through both of these points because regardless of the residual 
demand realization this offer curve would cross at an ex post expected profit-maximizing level of 
output. The straight line connecting the points (P1,Q1) and (P2,Q2) is one such expected profit-
maximizing offer curve. 
To illustrate the impact of more elastic residual demand curves on the offer curves submitted by an 
expected profit-maximizing supplier, Figure 3.13 repeats the construction of an expected profit-
maximizing offer curve for the case of two more elastic residual demand curve realizations. The line 
connecting the points (P1,Q1) and (P2,Q2), which is an expected profit-maximizing offer curve for 
these two residual demand realizations, is much closer to the supplier’s marginal cost curve. 
Specifically, for each residual demand realization, the price associated with the profit-maximizing 
level of output for that residual demand curve realization is closer to the marginal cost of producing 
that level of output than it was in Figure 3.12. This outcome occurs because each residual demand 
realization is much more elastic than the residual demand realizations in Figure 3.12.  
Figure 3.14 considers the case in which the two residual demand curve realizations are infinitely 
elastic, meaning that for both realizations the supplier sufficient competition so that the entire market 
can be satisfied at a fixed price. By the logic described above, the supplier will find it unilaterally 
profit-maximizing to produce at the intersection of each residual demand curve realization with its 
marginal cost curve. In this case, the supplier expected profit-maximizing offer curve, the line 
connecting the profit-maximizing output levels for each residual demand curve realization, is equal to 
the supplier’s marginal cost curve. This result illustrates a very important point that if a supplier faces How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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sufficient competition for all possible residual demand curve realizations then it will find it unilaterally 
expected profit-maximizing to submit an offer curve equal to its marginal cost curve. 
The examples in Figures 3.12 to 3.14 utilize linear residual demand curves. However, the same 
process can be followed to compute an expected profit-maximizing offer curve for the case of step-
function residual demand curves. Figure 3.15 shows how this would be done for the more realistic 
case of step function residual demand curves with two possible residual demand realizations. For each, 
residual demand curve realization, the supplier would compute the profit-maximizing level of output 
and market price for the marginal cost curve given in Figure 3.15. For DR1 this is the point (P1,Q1) and 
for DR2 this is the point (P2,Q2). If these two residual demand curve realizations were the only possible 
residual demands that the supplier could face, then a step function offer curve that passes through 
these two points would be an expected profit-maximizing offer curve. 
Computing the expected profit-maximizing offer curve for a supplier is generally more complex 
than passing an offer curve through the set of all possible ex post expected profit-maximizing price 
and output quantity pairs. That is because the market rules can prevent a supplier from achieving the 
ex post profit-maximizing market price and output quantity pair for all possible residual demand 
realizations. Specifically, unless all of these ex post profit-maximizing price and quantity pair lie along 
a willingness-to-supply curve for the supplier that the market rules allow it to submit, it is not possible 
for the supplier to submit a willingness to supply curve that always crosses the realized residual 
demand curve at an ex post profit-maximizing price and quantity pair for that residual demand curve 
realization. Figure 3.16 provides an example of this phenomenon. This figure shows the ex post profit-
maximizing price and quantity pairs for three residual demand curves. Note that the profit maximizing 
point for DR3 lies below and to the right of the profit maximizing point for DR1. This makes it 
impossible for the supplier to submit a non-decreasing step function offer curve that passes through 
the three ex post profit-maximizing price and output quantity pairs. In this case, the supplier must 
know the probability of each residual demand curve realization in order to choose the parameters of its 
expected profit-maximizing willingness to supply curve.  
Figure 3.16 demonstrates that the expected profit-maximizing residual demand curve does not pass 
through any of these three ex post profit-maximizing price/quantity pairs. Instead, as discussed in 
Wolak (2003a and 2007), the form of the expected profit-maximizing willingness-to-supply curve 
depends on both the form of each residual demand curve realization and the probability of that residual 
demand curve realization. This curve, shown in Figure 3.16, yields market-clearing price and quantity-
sold pairs for the firm for each of the three residual demand curve realizations that maximize the 
expected profits the firm earns subject to this offer curve being in the set of offer curves the market 
rules allow a supplier to submit. As shown in Wolak (2003a) and Wolak (2007), the supplier chooses 
the price level and quantity increments that determine its offer curve to maximize its expected profit 
over the distribution of residual demand curve realizations that it faces.  
Nevertheless, the inverse elasticity of the realized residual demand curve at the actual market-
clearing price still provides an ex post measure of the ability of a supplier to exercise market power. 
Specifically, this inverse elasticity quantifies the percentage increase in the market-clearing price that 
would have occurred if the supplier had reduced the amount of output it sold in the market by a pre-
specified percentage. This interpretation of the inverse elasticity of the residual demand curve does not 
rely on the assumption that the realized output level and market-clearing price maximize the supplier’s 
ex post profits.  
As emphasized in Wolak (2003a and 2007), expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour does not 
imply that every point of intersection of the supplier’s offer curve with its residual demand curve 
yields the ex post profit-maximizing price and output quantity pair for the supplier for that residual 
demand curve realization. Therefore, this result implies that in general, there is no deterministic 
relationship between the difference between the market-clearing price and the firm’s marginal cost of Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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production at its actual output level divided by the market-clearing price and the value of the inverse 
elasticity of the residual demand curve the supplier faces. 
3.3. Impact of Fixed-Price Forward Market Obligations on Short-Term Market Behaviour 
The above discussion of expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour assumes that the supplier only 
earns revenues from selling energy in the wholesale market. However, as noted earlier the four large 
suppliers in the New Zealand market are all vertically integrated. They not only sell energy in the 
wholesale electricity market, but they also sell electricity to retail customers at retail prices that do not 
vary with hourly prices in the wholesale market. These fixed-price retail load obligations function very 
much like fixed-price forward contract obligations, because the vertically-integrated supplier has 
essentially made a commitment to provide its fixed-price retail load obligation at a pre-determined 
wholesale price.  
For example, suppose that during a half-hour period in February 2006 Firm C had retail load 
obligations of 880 MW at various fixed prices. That means that Firm C would be obliged to supply 
880 MW retail load at those prices regardless of the actual wholesale price. This implies that Firm C 
has a strong financial incentive to purchase the 880 MW at the lowest price possible. Figure 3.17 
shows the offer curve and residual demand curve for Firm C in that period. By increasing the price at 
which it offered in its generation, Firm C could have moved to the point on its residual demand curve 
shown by the red dot. This would have increased the market price by 100% (from $120 to $240/MWh) 
and reduced the quantity supplied by Firm C by 35% (from 1,170 MW to 765 MW). As a result, Firm 
C’s generation revenue in this half-hour would have increased from $70,200 to $91,800. However, 
Firm C’s net revenue from transactions in the wholesale market would have decreased substantially. 
At the actual prices and quantities, Firm C sold 1,170 MW and bought 880 MW from the wholesale 
market, at the market price of $120/MWh. Therefore, its net position was 290 MW, the difference 
between 1,170 MW and 880 MW, so Firm C’s net revenue would have been $17,400 (290 MW at 
$120/MWh for one half-hour). At the higher price, Firm C would have sold 765MW while still buying 
880 MW from the wholesale market, now at the higher market price of $240/MWh. Firm C’s net 
position would have been -115 MW, and its net revenue -$13,800 (-115 MW at $240/MWh for one 
half-hour). This example demonstrates the importance of the supplier’s fixed-price load obligations in 
considering its incentive to increase the market price. 
In general, because a supplier with fixed-price retail load obligations must serve this load at a fixed 
price no matter what the actual wholesale price is, a wholesale price increase has two opposing effects 
on the supplier’s profits: (1) it increases the supplier’s profits from selling energy in the wholesale 
market; and (2) it decreases the suppliers’ profits by raising the cost of serving its retail demand. 
Consequently, whether and to what degree a price increase is beneficial to a vertically-integrated 
supplier depends on whether and to what degree the profit increase from withholding supply more 
than offsets the increase in cost of serving the supplier’s retail load covered by a fixed-price forward 
market obligation. If the profit loss due to the cost increase in (2) exceeds that profit gain in (1), a 
supplier would lose profits from a market price increase. In that case, the supplier would have no 
incentive to exercise market power by withholding output from the wholesale market to increase the 
market-clearing price. 
For a supplier, the comparison between its profit gain and loss from a price increase depends on the 
difference between the supplier’s sales in the short-term market and its fixed-price load obligations. 
For example, suppose that the supplier’s sales in the wholesale market are 2,000 MW while its fixed-
price load obligation is 1,500 MW. In that case, a $1 increase in market price would increase the 
supplier’s profits from its generation sales by $2,000 and increase the cost of its load obligation by 
$1,500, implying a net gain of $500 (or $1 times the 500 MW difference between the supplier’s supply 
of 2,000 MW and load obligations of 1,500 MW). In that case, the supplier has an incentive to 
increase the market price through its unilateral actions because it is profitable to do so. However, if the How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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supplier has a significantly larger load obligation of 2,500 MW, then the $1 increase in market price 
would imply a net loss of $500 (or $1 times the -500 MW difference between its supply and load 
obligations) as the supplier’s profit gain from its generation sales ($2,000) is less than the increase in 
its cost to serve the fixed-price retail load obligation ($2,500). 
To understand the incentives to exercise unilateral market power of a supplier with fixed-price 
retail load obligations or fixed-price long-term contract obligations define the following notation. Let 
PR equal the retail price at which the firm is selling QR MWh of retail electricity. Let DR(p) equal the 
firm’s residual demand curve for sales in the short-term market and p the market price. For simplicity, 
assume that c is the constant marginal cost of producing electricity and τ is average cost of distributing 
wholesale electricity to retail customers. The vertically-integrated sellers in New Zealand also 
participate in the market for fixed-price long-term contract obligations. Let PC equal the quantity-
weighted average price of fixed-price forward contract obligations held by the vertically integrated 
firm and QC equal the MWh quantity of fixed-price forward contract obligations. The firm’s profits 
from selling in wholesale market during that pricing period given these forward market commitments 
is equal to 
Π(p) = (PR – p)QR + DR(p)(p – c) – (p – PC)QC – τQR. 
The first term is the profits from retail sales. The second term is the profits from wholesale electricity 
sales in the short-term market. The third term is the profits or losses from fixed-price forward contract 
obligations, and the final term is the cost of distributing retail electricity. This expression for the 
vertically-integrated firm’s profits can be re-written as: 
 
Π(p) = (PR – τ – c)QR + (PC – c)QC + [DR(p) – (QR + QC)](p – c). 
The first and second terms are profits from retailing assuming QR cost c $/MWh to produce and the 
second term is the profit from sales of fixed price forward contracts assuming QC is produced at c 
$/MWh. The third term is the only one that depends on the short-term market price. The first and 
second terms only depend on variables that the supplier cannot influence at the time they are offering 
into the short-term market.  
This form of the firm’s profit function shows that the values of QR and QC, the firm’s retail load 
obligation and fixed-price forward contract obligations, influence its incentive to exercise unilateral 
market power. Even though the supplier may face a very inelastic residual demand curve, it would 
have little incentive to reduce the output it sells to raise prices above its marginal cost if the amount it 
sells in the short-term market, DR(p), is less than the sum of its fixed price forward market 
obligations, QR + QC. Under these circumstances, the vertically-integrated supplier is a net buyer from 
the short-term market. It has obligations for purchases of QR + QC from the short-term market and it 
only sells DR(p). As a net buyer, the supplier would like the price to be as low as possible. When 
DR(p) exceeds QR + QC the vertically-integrated supplier is a net seller in the wholesale market and as 
such would like to raise the price at which it sells its net output in the short-term market. 
  The difference between a firm’s sales in the short-term market and its fixed-price retail load 
and forward contract obligations is its residual demand net of its forward market obligations. In terms 
of the above notation, this net residual demand curve is equal to DRF(p) = DR(p) – (QR + QC). 
Depending on whether a supplier’s net residual demand is positive (“net long”) or negative (“net 
short”), the supplier has incentive to either increase or decrease the market price through its unilateral 
action. If a supplier is net long (i.e., has a positive net residual demand), it will benefit from a higher 
market price because it is making net sales into the short-term market. Consequently, the larger a 
supplier’s net residual demand, the greater is the supplier’s gain from a market price increase. 
Conversely, the more a supplier is net short (i.e., a negative net residual demand), the greater the 
supplier’s incentive to decrease the market price because it is a net buyer from the short-term market. Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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In terms of this net residual demand function, the firm’s profit function becomes: 
 
Π(p) = DRF(p)(p – c) + F, where F = (PR – τ – c)QR + (PC – c)QC. 
The first two terms in the profit function written above are collected into the term F because all of the 
variables comprising of these terms are not affected by the supplier’s offers into the short-term 
wholesale market and are known before the supplier submits its offers. This expression for the 
vertically integrated supplier’s profit function takes the same form as a non-vertically integrated 
supplier.  
To determine the firm’s profit-maximizing price and quantity pair we can solve for the value of p 
that maximizes the above expression. We can also follow a slightly more involved version of the 
graphical approach shown in Section 3.2. Figure 3.18 shows the net residual demand curve DRF(p), 
which is calculated by shifting the original residual demand curve DR(p) to the left by the amount of 
the supplier’s fixed-price forward market obligations, QR + QC. Using DRF(p) we can compute 
MRF(p), the supplier’s marginal revenue curve for sales in excess of its fixed-price forward market 
obligations. Because the firm’s production decision must still take account of its forward market 
position, Figure 3.19 shifts MRF(p) to the right by the amount of the fixed-price contract obligations. 
The firm produces at the point where MRF(p) + QR + QC, the shifted marginal revenue curve, 
intersects the marginal cost curve MC. This is output level Q4 in Figure 3.19. The short-term market 
price is determined by the supplier’s original residual demand curve at this level of production, the 
price P4 in Figure 3.19. 
Figure 3.20 demonstrates the impact of fixed-price forward market obligations on the supplier’s 
expected profit-maximizing price and output quantity pair. For the residual demand curve given in 
Figure 3.20, a supplier without any forward market obligations would find it optimal to produce at the 
price and output quantity pair (P1,Q1) that was derived in Figure 3.9. A supplier with the level of fixed 
price forward market obligations facing this same residual demand curve would find it unilaterally 
profit-maximizing to produce at the price and output quantity pair (P4,Q4). As shown in Figure 3.20, a 
firm with fixed-price forward market obligations facing the same residual demand curve finds it 
unilaterally profit-maximizing to sell more output in the short-term market at a lower prices, Q4 > Q1 
and P4 < P1.  
There is even a level of fixed-price forward market obligations that would cause a supplier facing a 
steep residual demand curve to find it unilaterally profit-maximizing to produce at the point of 
intersection of its marginal cost curve with its residual demand curve. Specifically, if QR + QC is 
chosen to equal DR(c), the value of output at the point of intersection of the residual demand curve 
with the supplier’s marginal cost curve, the supplier will find it unilateral profit-maximizing to 
produce at DR(c), regardless of the slope or inverse elasticity of the residual demand curve. In other 
words, a supplier that possesses substantial ability to exercise unilateral market power as measured by 
the inverse elasticity of its residual demand curve, has no incentive to do so because of the level of its 
fixed-price forward market obligations. 
The relationship in Figure 3.20 carries over to the case of constructing expected profit-maximizing 
offer curves with fixed-price forward market obligations. Figure 3.21 repeats the computation of the 
expected profit-maximizing offer curve for the same two residual demand curve realizations for the 
case of no fixed-price forward market obligations and positive fixed-price forward market obligations. 
For the case of a positive forward market obligation, the expected profit-maximizing offer curve is 
much closer to the firm’s marginal cost curve that the expected profit-maximizing offer curve derived 
assuming the firm has no fixed-price forward market obligations. This is a general result of the impact 
of fixed-price forward market obligations on the expected profit-maximizing offer curve of a supplier. 
The higher the level of fixed-price forward contract obligations relative to the supplier’s actual short-How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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term market sales, the closer is the expected profit-maximizing offer curve to the supplier’s marginal 
cost curve.  
Because fixed-price forward market obligations alter the incentive of a supplier to exercise 
unilateral market power, the net residual demand curve can be used to construct a measure of the 
incentive, as distinct from the ability, of a supplier to exercise unilateral market power. This measure 
is the inverse elasticity of the net residual demand curve. In terms of DRF(p) this inverse elasticity is 
defined as: 
1/ε
F = - [DRF(p)/p]*[1/DRF’(p)], 
which is also equal to the percentage change in the market-clearing price as a result of a one percent 
change in the net residual demand of the supplier. The inverse elasticity of the net residual demand 
curve is related to the inverse elasticity of the residual demand curve by the following equation 
 
1/ε
F = - {[DR(p)-[QR + QC)]/DR(p)}*[1/ε] where 1/ε = - [DR(p)/p]*[1/DR’(p)]. 
The inverse elasticity of the residual demand curve times the exposure of the supplier to the short-term 
market is equal to the inverse elasticity of the net residual demand curve. Note that in spite of the fact 
that the inverse elasticity of the residual demand curve is always positive the inverse elasticity of the 
net residual demand curve can be negative or zero. Zero occurs if the supplier’s short-term market 
sales equals its fixed-price forward market obligations, DR(p) = [QR + QC]. A negative inverse 
elasticity occurs if the supplier’s short-term market sales are less than its fixed-price forward market 
obligations, DR(p) < [QR + QC]. 
The same caveats apply to the use of the inverse elasticity of the net residual demand curve when it 
is applied to step function residual demand curves such as those that exist in the New Zealand 
electricity market. Specifically, the researcher must choose percentage changes in the market-clearing 
quantity and then compute the implied change in the market price from the residual demand curve. To 
compute values of the two inverse elasticities that are internally consistent, the most straightforward 
way is to compute the inverse elasticity of the residual demand curve and use the above relationship 
that relates this magnitude to the inverse elasticity of the net residual demand curve. For the same 
reasons as described above for the case of the inverse elasticity of the residual demand curve, expected 
profit-maximizing offer behaviour with fixed-price forward market obligations does not imply a 
deterministic relationship between the inverse elasticity of the net residual demand curve and the 
difference of the market price and the marginal cost of the supplier’s highest cost generation unit 
operating in that period divided by the market price. For similar reasons, the inverse elasticity of the 
net residual demand curve is still a measure of the incentive of a supplier to exercise market power. 
3.4. Pivotal Supplier and Net Pivotal Supplier as Measures of Unilateral Market Power 
The residual demand curve and net residual demand curve can be used to derive additional measures 
of the ability and incentive of a supplier to exercise unilateral market power. Different from the 
inverse elasticity, these measures typically depend on the behaviour of the residual demand curve and 
net residual demand curve at prices significantly higher than the market-clearing price. As a 
consequence, these measures capture a more extreme ability and incentive to exercise unilateral 
market power. 
Figure 3.22 shows the construction of a residual demand curve for the case in which the aggregate 
willingness-to-supply curve of all other suppliers reaches its capacity before system demand is met. As 
shown in the figure, this yields a residual demand facing the supplier that is positive for all possible 
prices. Because the real-time demand for electricity is perfectly inelastic and the production of 
electricity is subject to capacity constraints, it is possible for the residual demand curve facing a Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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supplier to become perfectly inelastic at some positive output level. A supplier that faces a residual 
demand curve that is positive for all possible positive prices is said to be a pivotal supplier because 
some of its supply is necessary to serve the market demand regardless of the offer price.  
The output level at which the supplier’s residual demand curve become perfectly inelastic is called 
the pivotal quantity and it is shown in Figure 3.22 as the quantity associated with the vertical portion 
of the residual demand curve. Mathematically, a supplier is pivotal if DR(pmax) > 0 where pmax is the 
highest possible price that could occur in the market. The quantity DR(pmax) is called the pivotal 
quantity. If a supplier is pivotal, this means that regardless of the offer price it submits, at least the 
pivotal quantity must be accepted from that supplier. A pivotal supplier has the ability to set the 
market price as high as it would like if it is willing sell only the pivotal quantity. Although a pivotal 
supplier clearly has a substantial ability to exercise unilateral market power, it may not have an 
incentive to do so because of its fixed-price forward market obligations. In particular, if the supplier’s 
fixed-price forward market obligations exceed its pivotal quantity, DR(pmax), then the supplier would 
have no incentive to exploit the fact that it is pivotal for the reason that it is a net buyer of energy at 
output levels equal to or below its pivotal quantity. 
The net residual demand curve can be used determine whether a pivotal supplier would have an 
incentive to exploit the fact that it is pivotal. Specifically, if a supplier is net pivotal, then clearly it has 
such an incentive. A supplier is said to be net pivotal if DRF(pmax) > 0. The quantity DRF(pmax) is called 
the net pivotal quantity. By the definition of the net residual demand function, if a supplier is net 
pivotal and it has positive fixed-price forward market obligations, then the supplier is also pivotal. 
This means that regardless of the offer price it submits, at least DR(pmax), the pivotal quantity (not the 
net pivotal quantity) of energy must be accepted from the supplier. Different from a pivotal supplier, a 
net pivotal supplier has a very strong incentive to exercise unilateral market power the larger is the net 
pivotal quantity because it earns the short-term price on its net sales at the market-clearing price, 
DRF(p).  
To summarize, a supplier can be pivotal and therefore have a significant ability to raise short-term 
prices. However, this supplier has little incentive to exploit its pivotal status if its fixed-price forward 
market obligations exceed its pivotal quantity, i.e., it is not net pivotal. Conversely, if a supplier is net 
pivotal, then it is also pivotal and has both a substantial incentive and ability to exercise unilateral 
market power. This incentive to exercise unilateral market power is greater the larger is the supplier’s 
net pivotal quantity.  
It is important to emphasize that a supplier cannot determine whether it is pivotal until the level of 
demand is realized and all supply offers of its competitors are known. Because the market rules 
require all suppliers to submit their offer at the same time and the market demand is not known when 
these offers are submitted, no supplier knows with certainty if it will be pivotal when it submits its 
offers. However, there are number of factors that can help suppliers predict when it might be pivotal. 
For example, an unexpectedly high level of demand or a large generation or transmission outage can 
create system conditions when one or more suppliers is pivotal.  
Figures 3.23 to 3.25 depicts an example of the tradeoff that a supplier faces in deciding whether to 
submit offers into the short-term market to exploit the fact that it is pivotal. This figure considers the 
case of two residual demand curve realizations. For the low residual demand curve realization, 
DRL(p), the supplier is not pivotal. For the high residual demand curve realization, DRH(p), the 
supplier is pivotal. Let 0 < θ < 1 denote the probability of the high residual demand realization and 1 – 
θ the probability of a low residual demand realization. Figure 3.23 draws S1(p), the expected profit-
maximizing offer curve, for these two residual demand realizations assuming that the firm does not 
exploit the fact that it is pivotal for DRH(pmax). 
However, if the probability of the high residual demand curve realization is sufficiently high, then 
it may be expected profit-maximizing for the supplier to exploit the fact that it is pivotal by submitting 
the willingness-to-supply curve, S2(p), shown in Figure 3.24, that crosses its residual demand curve at How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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the point DRH(pmax). By doing so, the supplier forgoes the ability to sell any output if the low residual 
demand curve realization occurs. However, this may be expected profit-maximizing if the probability 
of being pivotal times the profits the supplier earns from selling DRH(pmax) at pmax exceeds the 
expected profits from submitting the willingness-to-supply curve in Figure 3.24 and selling DRH(pH) 
in the high demand state and DRL(pL). Let C(q) denote the variable cost of producing output level q. 
An expected profit-maximizing supplier will decide to exploit the fact it is pivotal and submit an offer 
curve that sets pmax in the high residual demand realization if the following inequality holds: 
 
θ(DRH(pmax)pmax - C(DRH(pmax)) > θ(DRH(pH)pH - C(DRH(pH)) + (1- θ)(DRL(pL)pL - 
C(DRL(pL)), 
meaning that the expected profits of selling in the high demand states at pmax and selling zero in the 
low demand state exceeds the expected profits from selling at pH in the high demand state and pL in the 
low demand state. 
Figure 3.25 shows an example of when the supplier is likely to find it expected profit-maximizing 
to submit S2(p) instead of S1(p). The long thin vertical expected profits from submitting S2(p), labeled 
E(π(S2(p))), is larger than the expected profits of submitting S1(p), labeled E(π(S1(p))). The above 
inequality illustrates several points about the likelihood a supplier will exploit its pivotal status. The 
higher the values of pmax, the size of the supplier’s pivotal quantity, and the probability the supplier is 
pivotal, the greater is the likelihood that the supplier will submit an offer curve that exploits the fact 
that it is pivotal. 
Factoring in the impact of fixed-price forward market obligations complicates the analysis slightly 
although the basic insight about the determinants of when a supplier will exploit the fact that it is net 
pivotal remains. The supplier compares the expected profits from selling at pmax during high residual 
demand curve realizations when it is net pivotal to the expected profit from submitting the expected 
profit-maximizing offer curve that does not exploit the fact that it is net pivotal. If the supplier assesses 
that the former expected profits are higher, then it will submit an offer curve that exploits the fact that 
it is pivotal. This logic suggests that when a supplier believes that the probability of being net pivotal 
is high, it will significantly increase its offer prices. The empirical validity of this prediction will be 
explored in the next section. 
4.0. Empirical Evidence on How Suppliers Exercise Market Power 
This section uses supplier offers, water reservoir levels, and market outcomes to demonstrate a number 
of empirical regularities in the behaviour of the four large suppliers and market outcomes in the New 
Zealand market. First, summary statistics are presented on the behaviour of half-hourly measures of 
both the unilateral ability and incentive to exercise unilateral market power for each of the four large 
suppliers. These half-hourly measures of the ability and incentive to exercise unilateral market power 
are shown to be highly positively correlated with the value of the quantity-weighted average half-
hourly market-clearing price.  
To demonstrate that this observed positive correlation between the average half-hourly firm-level 
unilateral ability and incentive to exercise market power and half-hourly market prices is the direct 
result of market participant behaviour, the second line of empirical evidence demonstrates that 
expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour implies that a supplier’s half-hourly offer price—the price 
at which it is willing to sell a pre-specified amount of energy to the short-term wholesale market—
should be positively correlated with both its ability and incentive to exercise unilateral market power 
during that half-hour. Econometric analysis is then used to quantify the empirical relationship between 
the half-hourly offer price of each supplier and the half-hourly value of an index of that supplier’s 
unilateral ability to exercise unilateral market power, after controlling for other exogenous factors Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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impacting half-hourly market outcomes such as water levels and fossil fuel prices. Further 
econometric analysis examines the empirical relationship between the half-hourly offer price of each 
supplier and the half-hourly value of an index of that supplier’s unilateral incentive to exercise 
unilateral market power. We find that when each of the four suppliers has a greater ability or greater 
incentive to exercise unilateral market power, they submit substantially higher half-hourly offer prices 
for a pre-specified quantity of energy. 
4.1. Market Outcomes and the Unilateral Ability and Incentive to Exercise Market Power 
Section 3 derived measures of the unilateral ability and incentive of a supplier to exercise market 
power that can be computed on a system-wide basis or separately for the North and South Islands 
using the half-hourly level of demand and the willingness-to-supply curves of all market participants. 
In this section, we derive modifications of these measures that the theory of expected profit-
maximizing offer behaviour derived in Section 3 implies should be related to the half-hourly market-
clearing price. 
As shown in Section 3.2, the form of the residual demand curve that a supplier faces determines its 
ability to exercise unilateral market power. The inverse of the elasticity of the residual demand curve 
evaluated at the market-clearing price is one measure of the ability of a supplier to exercise unilateral 
market power. This inverse elasticity measures the percent change in the market-clearing price that 
would result from the supplier producing one percent less output than it actually produced during that 
half-hour period. 
Under the simplified model of expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour described in Figures 
3.12 and 3.13, this inverse elasticity measure can be directly related to the market-clearing price and 
the marginal cost of the highest cost unit owned by that supplier operating during that half-hour 
period. The logic underlying the construction of the expected profit-maximizing offer curve in Figure 
3.12 implies that the point (P1,Q1) is the ex post profit-maximizing price/quantity pair for the firm for 
the residual demand realization DR1(p) and the point (P2,Q2) is the ex post profit-maximizing 
price/quantity pair for the firm for the residual demand realization DR2(p). The first-order conditions 
for ex post profit-maximization for these two residual demand realizations are: 
 
(P1 – C1)/P1 = -1/ε1 and (P2 – C2)/P2 = -1/ε2      (4.1) 
where Ci (i=1,2) is the marginal cost for supplier i at output level Qi (i=1,2) and -1/εi (i=1,2) is the 
inverse of the elasticity of the residual demand curve for that residual demand realization.  
Recall that the inverse elasticity is defined in terms of the residual demand curve as: 
 
-1/ε i = [DRi(Pi)/Pi]*[1/DRi’(Pi)]      (4.2) 
where DRi’(Pi) is the slope of residual demand curve i evaluated at price Pi, and DRi(Pi) is the value of 
residual demand curve evaluated at price Pi. Using this definition of the inverse elasticity, the two 
equations in (1) can be rearranged to equal: 
 
Pi = Ci - [DRi(Pi)/DRi’(Pi)],  i=1,2.     (4.3) 
Equation (4.3) implies that the market-clearing price is equal to the marginal cost of the highest cost 
unit owned by that supplier operating during that half-hour plus the level of the residual demand curve 
divided by the absolute value of the slope of the residual demand curve.  
Define ηi (i=1,2), the inverse semi-elasticity of the residual demand curve i, as: How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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ηi = - (1/100)[DRi(Pi)/DRi’(Pi)].        (4.4) 
This magnitude gives the $/MWh increase in the market-clearing price associated with a one percent 
reduction in the amount of output sold by the supplier. In terms of this notation, equation (4.3) 
becomes 
Pi = Ci + 100ηi,  i=1,2.       (4.5) 
Thus, the simplified model of expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour implies that higher market-
clearing prices should be associated with higher values of the inverse semi-elasticity. 
As discussed in Section 3, because offer curves in the New Zealand wholesale market are step 
functions, residual demand curve realizations do not strictly satisfy the assumptions implied by the 
simplified model of expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour presented there, so that equation (4.5) 
will not hold with equality. However, the general model of expected profit-maximizing offer 
behaviour described in Section 3 implies that when a supplier has a greater ability to exercise 
unilateral market power as measured by the size of ηi, the $/MWh price increase that results from 
reducing the amount it sells in the wholesale market by one percent, that supplier’s offer price is likely 
to be higher. 
Computing the slope of the residual demand curve at the market-clearing price for a step-function 
residual demand curve requires choosing the output change used to compute the finite-difference 
approximation to the slope. These output changes should be large enough to ensure that enough price 
steps on the residual demand curve are crossed so that a non-zero slope is obtained, but not too large 
that the implied output change is judged as implausible for the supplier to implement. We also want to 
choose a procedure for selecting the output changes to ensure that the value of slope obtained is not 
sensitive to the size of the output changes used to compute it.  
Figure 4.1 describes the details of the process we use to compute the slope of the residual demand 
curve for Firm B for a peak half-hour period in February 2006. Suppose that Q*= 901 MW is the 
output sold by Firm B at the market-clearing price for this half-hour period of P* = $145/MWh. We 
want to approximate the slope of the residual demand curve in the vicinity of (P*,Q*). Consider a 10% 
price change window on either side of P*, and look for the closest steps on the residual demand curve 
to (P*,Q*) that lie outside this 10% price window. The closest point below P* that has price less than 
0.9 times P* is ($129, 969). Call this point (P1, Q1). Above P* the closest point with price greater than 
1.1 times P* is ($164, 871). Call this point (P2,Q2). The slope of the residual demand curve DR(P*) at 
(P*, Q*) according to this procedure is given by the formula: 
 
DR’(P*) = (Q1 –Q2)/(P1 – P2) = (969-871)/(129-164) = -2.8    (4.6) 
The resulting inverse semi-elasticity at (P*,Q*) for this residual demand curve gives the $/MWh price 
increase from a 1% reduction in output and is equal to: 
 
η = -(1/100)DR(P*)/DR’(P*) = - (1/100)Q*/ DR’(P*) = -(1/100) 901/(-2.81) = 3.21.   (4.7) 
This semi-elasticity quantifies the ability of Firm B to raise prices during this half-hour period by 
reducing its output by 1%. This magnitude implies that if Firm B reduces its output by 1% relative to 
Q* = 901 MW, the increase in the market price would be $3.21/MWh. Figure 4.2 shows the same 
calculation for Firm B in the half-hour period exactly one year later. For this period, -
(1/100)Q*/DR’(p) = 0.29. That is, a 1% reduction in output would produce an increase in the market 
price of $0.29/MWh, a significantly lower price increase from the same 1% output reduction. Note 
that this inverse semi-elasticity is significantly lower, despite the fact that Firm B is producing over 
180 MW more during this half-hourly period than in the same period during 2006. These two figures Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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demonstrates the usefulness of the inverse semi-elasticity as measure of the ability of a supplier to 
exercise unilateral market power because high and low values of this measure can occur for both high 
and low output levels of the supplier. 
To demonstrate the robustness of our inverse semi-elasticity estimates to the price change window 
used for the calculation, Table 4.1 compares the results from calculating the inverse semi-elasticity for 
the four large suppliers in each half-hour from January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007, using four different 
values for the price change window: 1%, 5%, 10% and 15%. For each supplier, the overall mean value 
of the semi-elasticity is shown for each price window. For example, using a price window of +/-15% 
the mean inverse semi-elasticity for Firm C is 1.27, compared to a mean inverse semi-elasticity of 1.21 
using a price window of +/-1%. The table also shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the 
half-hourly inverse semi-elasticities calculated for different price windows. These show that there is 
high correlation (in all cases greater than 0.80) between the values calculated for different price 
windows. This provides strong empirical evidence that our inverse semi-elasticities are not sensitive to 
the choice of the price window used to compute them. For the remainder of this chapter all results are 
shown based on the inverse semi-elasticities calculated with a 10 percent price window. 
To compare time series behaviour of the inverse semi-elasticities across firms, Figure 4.3 plots the 
30-day moving average of the half-hourly values of the inverse semi-elasticities for the four largest 
firms from January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007. The half-hourly inverse semi-elasticities follow a very 
similar pattern across the four firms and certain suppliers have persistently larger values than other 
suppliers. The maximum value of the smoothed inverse semi-elasticities shown in the figure is 10, 
with the values for Firm A peaking at close to 20 during early 2003 and the peak values for Firm C for 
this time period also exceeding 10. Over the entire sample period, Firm A’s smoothed inverse semi-
elasticities tend to be the highest, followed by Firm C, then by Firm B, and finally by Firm D. 
To provide a clear picture of the magnitude of persistent differences across the four suppliers 
in this index of the ability to exercise unilateral market power, Figure 4.4 presents the sample mean of 
the half-hourly values of ηihd, the semi-elasticity for supplier i during half-hour h of day d. Each point 
on the graph in Figure 4.4 for supplier i is equal to ηih(mean) =  , where D is the total 
number of days in the sample period of January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007. Firm A has the highest value 
of ηih(mean) for all half-hours and Firm D the lowest for all half-hours. Firm B is slightly higher than 
Firm D for all half-hours and the values for Firm C are roughly midway between the values for Firm B 
and Firm A. 
It is important to emphasize that these inverse semi-elasticities only depend on the quantity sold in 
the market and the form of the residual demand curve faced by supplier under consideration at that 
quantity. For example, the inverse semi-elasticity for Firm A for a given half-hour depends only on the 
half-hourly market-clearing quantity, the half-hourly offer curves of all other suppliers besides Firm 
A, and the level of system demand during that half-hour, but it measures the $/MWh increase in the 
half-hourly market price that would result from Firm A supplying 1% less output during that half-
hour. 
To demonstrate the very close relationship between half-hourly market-clearing prices and the 
half-hourly ability of the four large suppliers to exercise unilateral market power (as measured by the 
inverse semi-elasticity of their residual demand curves), Figure 4.5 plots the 30-day moving average of 
the half-hourly values of the quantity-weighted average of the nodal prices and a 30-day moving 
average of the half-hourly values of the unweighted average of the four values ηihd for Firms A to D, How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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which is equal to ηhd(firm) =  . Define phdm as the price at node m during half-hour h of 
day d and qhdm as the total amount of energy injected at node m during half-hour h and day d. Figure 
4.5 shows that the time series pattern of  ,  the quantity-weighted 
average of the nodal prices for half-hour h of day d, closely tracks ηhd(firm). During periods when the 
average index of the ability of these suppliers to exercise unilateral market power is high, the quantity-
weighted average of the nodal prices they are paid is also very high. Specifically, during mid-2001, 
early 2003, and early 2006 the average index of the ability of suppliers to exercise unilateral market 
power is high and the quantity-weighted average nodal price is high. Conversely, during periods when 
the average index of the ability of these suppliers to exercise unilateral market power is low, the 
quantity-weighted average of the nodal prices is significantly lower. This occurs during 2002, 2004, 
and 2005. 
Figure 4.6 plots that the sample half-hourly means of ηhd(firm),   and the 
sample half-hourly means of the quantity-weighted average nodal prices,   for our 
sample period. The average pattern throughout the day of the average half-hourly market-wide ability 
of the four suppliers to exercise unilateral market power very closely tracks the average half-hourly 
pattern of the quantity-weighted average price throughout the day. Figure 4.6 clearly demonstrates that 
over our sample period from January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007, a greater average half-hourly ability of 
each supplier to exercise unilateral market power is coincident with a higher average half-hourly 
market-clearing price. 
Even if a supplier possesses a substantial ability to exercise unilateral market power, it may not 
submit willingness-to-supply curves that reflect this ability if it has no incentive to exercise unilateral 
market power. As shown in Section 3, a supplier with fixed-price forward market obligations 
approximately equal to its sales in the short-term wholesale market has little incentive to exercise 
unilateral market power, even if it has a substantial ability to do so. This logic suggests that half-
hourly measures of the unilateral incentive of each supplier to exercise unilateral market power should 
be correlated with both market-clearing prices and the level of offer prices that each supplier submits. 
Inverse semi-elasticities for the net-of-forward market obligations residual demand curves can be 
computed from these inverse semi-elasticities to obtain measures of the incentive (as opposed to 
ability) of individual suppliers to exercise unilateral market power. Under the simplified model of 
expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour described in Section 3, the inverse semi-elasticities of the 
net-of-forward obligations residual demand curve can be directly related to the market-clearing price 
and the marginal cost of the highest cost unit owned by that supplier operating during that half-hour 
period.  Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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The logic underlying the construction of the expected profit-maximizing offer curve with forward 
market obligations drawn in Figure 3.21 implies that the point of intersection between the offer curve 
and each residual demand realization is an ex post profit-maximizing price/quantity pair for the firm 
for each residual demand realization given the forward market obligations of the supplier, QC. For the 
two residual demand curve realizations in Figure 3.21, the first-order conditions for ex post profit-
maximization for these two residual demand realizations are: 
 
(P1 – C1)/P1 = -1/ε1
C and (P2 – C2)/P2 = -1/ε2
C      (4.8) 
where Ci (i=1,2) is the marginal cost for supplier i at the output level Qi (i=1,2) and -1/εi
C (i=1,2) is the 
inverse elasticity of the net-of-forward market obligations residual demand curve for that residual 
demand realization. 
Recall from Section 3 that the inverse elasticity of the net-of-forward market obligations residual 




 = [(DRi(Pi)- QC)/Pi]*[1/DRi’(Pi)] = -1/εi [(DRi(Pi)- QC)/DRi(Pi)].   (4.9) 
The first equality defines this inverse elasticity and the second demonstrates that it is equal to the 
inverse elasticity of the residual demand curve multiplied by the firm’s exposure to short-term market 
prices. This exposure is measured by the difference between the supplier’s short-term market sales, 
DRi(Pi), and its forward market obligations, QC, divided by its short-term market sales.  
Using this definition of the inverse elasticity net-of-forward market obligations, the two equations 
in (4.8) can be rearranged to equal: 
 
Pi = Ci - [(DRi(Pi) – QC )/DRi’(Pi)],  i=1,2.     (4.10)   
Equation (4.10) implies that if an expected profit-maximizing supplier has fixed-price forward market 
obligations, the market-clearing price is equal to the marginal cost of the highest cost generation unit 
operating during that half-hour owned by the supplier plus the value of the net-of-forward market 
obligations residual demand curve, DRi
C(p) = (DRi(Pi) – QC), divided by the slope of this residual 
demand curve.  
Define ηi
C (i=1,2), the net inverse semi-elasticity of the net-of-forward market obligations residual 
demand curve i, as: 
 
ηi
C = - (1/100)[(DRi
C(Pi)/DRi
C '(Pi)] = ηi[(DRi(Pi) – QC )/DRi(Pi)].   (4.11) 
The first equality defines ηi
C in terms of the net of fixed-price forward market obligations residual 
demand curve. The second equality demonstrates that it is equal to the inverse semi-elasticity of the 
residual demand multiplied by the supplier’s exposure to short-term prices. This value of ηi
C gives the 
$/MWh increase in the market-clearing price associated with a one percent reduction in the net 
position of the supplier, the difference between its short-term market sales and its fixed-price forward 
market obligations. In terms of this notation, equation (4.10) becomes 
 
Pi = Ci + 100ηi
C,  i=1,2.       (4.12) 
This equation demonstrates that the simplified model of expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour 
with fixed-price forward market obligations implies that higher offer prices and higher market-clearing How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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prices are associated with higher values of the inverse semi-elasticity of the net-of-fixed price forward 
market obligations residual demand curve after controlling for the variable cost of the highest cost 
generation unit in that supplier’s portfolio of generation units operating during that half-hour period, 
Ci in equation (4.12). 
To compute the half-hourly value of the inverse semi-elasticity of the net-of-forward market 
obligations residual demand curve for each of the four largest suppliers, we use the second equality in 
equation (4.11) which computes this index of the incentive of a supplier to exercise unilateral market 
power by multiplying the inverse semi-elasticity of the residual demand curve by that supplier’s 
exposure to short-term wholesale prices at the market-clearing price P*, (DR(P*) – QC), divided by the 
supplier’s short-term market sales, DR(P*). This approach to computing ηi
C ensures that the same 
estimate of the slope of the step-function residual demand curve is used to compute both ηi and ηi
C.  
As discussed in Section 3, the assumptions required for the validity of the simplified model of 
expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour with fixed-price forward market obligations do not hold 
because suppliers submit non-decreasing step functions rather than increasing continuous functions as 
their willingness-to-supply curves. It is important to emphasize that even if the assumptions necessary 
for the strict validity of the simplified model of expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour do not 
hold, ηi
C is still a valid measure of the half-hourly incentive of a supplier to exercise unilateral market 
power. It equals the $/MWh increase in the market-clearing price that results from the supplier a 1% 
net position than it actually had during that half-hour period. As shown in the first-equality of equation 
(4.11), this measure depends on the half-hourly offers of all other suppliers and the supplier’s short-
term market sales minus its fixed-price forward market obligation. 
Figure 4.7 graphs the 30-day moving average of the net inverse semi-elasticities over the sample 
period of January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007 computed as described above. For the value of QC in 
equation (11), we use the half-hourly value of the retail load obligation of that supplier. Because there 
is a small, but sometimes important, fixed-price forward contract market in New Zealand and a small 
amount of retail load pays a retail price that varies with the half-hourly wholesale price, there is the 
potential for a small amount of measurement error between the true value of QC and the supplier’s 
retail load obligation. 
Figure 4.7 demonstrates the mitigating influence of fixed price forward contracts on the ability of 
suppliers to exercise unilateral market power. All of the inverse semi-elasticities of the residual 
demand curve are reduced significantly in absolute value as a result of multiplying them by the half-
hourly value of the net exposure of the supplier to short-term prices, [(DRi(Pi) - QC)/DRi(Pi)]. This net 
exposure can be negative if the supplier sells less in the short-term market than its fixed-price forward 
market obligations, QC. This explains why some of the smoothed values of ηi
C are negative for certain 
suppliers during portions of the sample period. 
As shown in Figure 4.3, all four suppliers had more than double the ability to exercise unilateral 
market power in early 2003 relative to mid-2001, as measured by smoothed half-hourly semi-
elasticities during the two time periods. Only Firm C translated this larger ability into a large incentive 
to raise short-term prices as measured by the value of ηi
C. Consequently, one explanation for the 
slightly longer period of higher prices that prevailed during mid-2001 is that a larger number of 
suppliers had a significant incentive to exercise unilateral market power during mid-2001 versus early 
2003. 
Figure 4.8 plots the 30-day moving average of the half-hourly values of the quantity-weighted 
average of the nodal prices and a 30-day moving average of the half-hourly values of   
Figure 4.8 shows that the time series pattern of  , the quantity-weighted average of the nodal 
prices for half-hour h of day d, closely tracks the time series pattern  . During the half-hour 
periods when this average index of the incentive of these suppliers to exercise unilateral market power Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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is larger, the quantity-weighted average of the nodal prices is high. Specifically, during mid-2001, 
early 2003, and early 2006 the average index of the incentive of suppliers to exercise unilateral market 
power is high and the quantity-weighted average nodal price is high. Conversely, during periods when 
the average index of the incentives of these suppliers to exercise unilateral market power is close to 
zero, the smoothed quantity-weighted average of the nodal prices is significantly lower. This occurs 
during 2002, 2004, and 2005. 
This section has shown that both the ability and incentive of all four suppliers to exercise unilateral 
market power are positively correlated with market-clearing prices. The ability to exercise unilateral 
market power is clearly a necessary condition for a supplier to exercise unilateral market power 
because a supplier must face an upward-sloping residual demand curve to be able to raise market 
prices by withholding its output. However, even a supplier with a substantial ability to exercise 
unilateral market power may not exploit this ability unless it has an incentive to do so. As noted above, 
the difference between a supplier’s short-term market sales and its fixed-price forward market 
obligations determines the supplier’s incentive to exercise unilateral market power. 
5. Offer Behaviour and Ability and Incentive to Exercise Market Power 
The previous section has demonstrated that the ability and incentive to exercise unilateral market 
power is very highly correlated with the level of market prices. This section explores the extent to 
which this relationship is due to suppliers exercising unilateral market power by raising their offer 
prices during periods when they have an increased ability and incentive to exercise market power. As 
discussed in Section 3, the theory of expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour implies that suppliers 
exercising all available unilateral market power will submit higher offer prices when they have a 
greater ability and incentive to exercise unilateral market power. This section provides empirical 
confirmation for this implication of expected profit-maximizing behaviour. 
We find that after controlling for differences over days of the sample and half-hours of the day or 
half-hours of the day during each month of our sample period in an individual supplier’s opportunity 
cost of producing electricity from their generation units, higher values of three different indexes of a 
supplier’s unilateral ability to exercise market power are associated with a higher offer price for the 
quantity of energy dispatched during that half-hour period by that supplier. A similar statement holds 
for three analogous indexes of the supplier’s unilateral incentive to exercise market power. After 
controlling for opportunity cost differences over time, higher values of each index of the incentive to 
exercise unilateral market power are associated with a higher offer price for the quantity of energy 
dispatched during that half-hour period by that supplier. The absolute values of the regression 
coefficient estimates associated with the incentive of a supplier to exercise unilateral market power are 
uniformly higher for all market participants than the corresponding coefficient estimates for the 
regressions using the unilateral ability measure. This outcome is consistent with the discussion in 
Section 3 that the incentive to exercise unilateral market power is a key determinant of a supplier’s 
offer price if it has significant fixed-price forward market obligations, as is the case for all of four 
large suppliers under consideration. 
In order to describe our empirical analysis a definition of a supplier’s half-hourly offer price is 
required. Figure 4.9 presents the actual offer curve for Firm A for a half-hour period in February 2006. 
The dispatched quantity of energy for Firm A during that half-hour is 1,508 MW. The offer price 
along Firm A’s willingness-to-supply curve for that half-hour period is found by extending a vertical 
line up from the horizontal axis at 1,508 MW until it intersects Firm A’s willingness-to-supply curve. 
In this case, the offer price for the dispatched quantity for Firm A is equal to $145/MWh, which is the 
offer step directly above the quantity level 1,508 MW. In general, the offer price for output level Q
* How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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for supplier k during half-hour period h is computed as the solution to the following equation in P: Q
*= 
Shk(P), where Shk(P) is supplier k’s willingness-to-supply curve during half-hour period h. 
As equations (4.5) and (4.12) in Section 4.1 demonstrate, the simplified model of expected profit-
maximizing offer behaviour by a supplier facing a distribution of downward sloping residual demand 
curves implies that, after controlling for the opportunity cost of the highest cost generation unit 
operating during that half-hour period (the term Ci in these two equations), a supplier’s offer price at 
the quantity of energy that it sells in the short-term market should be an increasing function of the 
value of the inverse semi-elasticity, if the supplier has no fixed-price forward market obligations, and 
increasing in the net inverse semi-elasticity if the supplier has fixed-price forward market obligations. 
Although the conditions necessary for the strict validity of the simplified model of expected profit-
maximizing offer behaviour outlined in Section 3 do not hold for the New Zealand market, we still 
expect these two implications of the model to hold. Specifically, when a supplier has a greater 
unilateral ability or incentive to exercise unilateral market power, after controlling for its opportunity 
cost of selling energy from its highest cost generation unit operating during that hour, the offer price it 
sets for the amount of energy that it sells in the short-term market should be higher. 
Let Pjhdm(actual) equal the offer price at the actual level of output sold by supplier j during half-
hour h of day d during month of sample m, ηjhdm the inverse semi-elasticity of supplier j’s residual 
demand curve during half-hour h of day d during month of sample m and η
C
jhdm the inverse net semi-
elasticity of supplier j’s net-of-forward-market-obligation residual demand curve during half-hour h of 
day d during month of sample m. We take two approaches to controlling for differences across half-
hours during our sample period in the variable cost of the highest cost generation unit owned by that 
supplier operating during that half-hour period. The first approach assumes that this variable cost can 
be different for each supplier for every day during our sample period and each half-hour during the 
day. The following regressions are estimated for each supplier j: 
 
Pjhdm(offer) = αdmj + τhj + βjηjhdm + εjhdm and Pjhdm(offer) = γdmj + μhj + δjη
C
jhdm + νjhdm,   (5.1) 
where the αdmj and γdmj are day-of-month d for month-of-sample m fixed effects and the τhj and μhj are 
half-hour-of-the-day fixed effects. The εjhdm and νjhdm are mean zero and constant variance regression 
errors. Input fossil fuel prices and water levels change at most on a daily basis. Because there is a 
different fixed effect for each day and month combination during our sample period, these fixed 
effects completely account for the impact of daily changes in fossil fuel prices and water levels during 
our sample period on the variable cost of the highest cost generation unit owned by supplier j that is 
operating during each half-hour period in the day. Consequently, these day-of-sample fixed-effects 
completely control for any differences across days of the sample in input fossil fuel prices and water 
levels. The half-hourly fixed-effects account for differences across half-hours of the day in this 
variable cost. This strategy for controlling for variable cost changes across half-hours of the sample 
implies more than 2,400 possible variable cost values over the sample period for each supplier. 
Multiplying this figure by four implies more than 9,600 possible variable costs of the highest cost 
generation unit operating during a half-hour that could set the market-clearing price during our 
sample. 
Our second strategy for controlling for the opportunity cost of producing electricity from the 
highest variable cost unit operating during half-hour period-of-the-day h during month of the sample 
m for supplier j uses different half-hour-of-the-day fixed-effects for each month of the sample period. 
The two equations estimated are: 
 
Pjhdm(offer) = αhmj + βjηjhdm + εjhdm and Pjhdm(offer) = γhmj + δjη
C
jhdm + νjhdm,   (5.2) Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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where αhmj and γhmj are half-hour-of-the-day for each month-of-the-sample fixed effects to control for 
the differences in the opportunity cost of producing electricity from the highest variable cost unit 
operating during half-hour period-of-the-day h during month-of-the-sample m for supplier j. The εjhdm 
and νjhdm are once again mean zero and constant variance regression errors. Because there are 48 half-
hour periods in the day and 78 months during our sample period from January 1, 2001 to June 30, 
2007, there are 48 x 78 = 3,744 values of the αhmj and the same number of values of the γhmj for each 
supplier j. These fixed-effects imply that the variable cost of producing electricity from the highest 
cost generation unit operating during half-hour 12 in month 3 of the sample period can be different 
from this same variable cost during all other months of the sample period. Moreover, the variable cost 
of producing electricity from the highest cost generation unit operating during half-hour 12 in month 3 
can differ from the variable cost of producing electricity in any other half-hour of any other month of 
the sample period, including month 3. 
These fixed-effects allow for a substantial amount of variability in the time path of the variable cost 
of the highest cost unit operating in the North and South Island of New Zealand during each half-hour 
of our sample period. There are 3,744 fixed effects for each supplier to account for differences in the 
variable cost of the highest cost unit in their portfolio operating during each half-hour of the sample 
period. Multiplying this figure by 4 implies 14,976 different possible variable costs of the highest cost 
unit operating owned by the four large suppliers that could set prices during our sample period. 
The fixed-effects in model (5.1) and model (5.2) should be more than sufficient to account for 
differences in the variable cost of the highest cost generation unit operating during each half-hour of 
the sample period in the portfolio of generation units owned by each of the four large suppliers. The 
opportunity cost of producing electricity from hydroelectric generation units should not differ 
significantly across half-hours of the day or days of the month in a hydroelectric dominated system. 
The opportunity cost of water depends on current water storage levels and the distribution of future 
water inflows and outflows. New information about these variables arrives daily, but the best estimates 
of future inflows and outflows changes slowly as do water storage levels. Our day-of-sample fixed 
effects are more than sufficient to account for changes in the opportunity cost of water over our 
sample period. 
The variable cost of producing electricity from individual fossil fuel generation units is unlikely to 
change significantly during individual months of our sample period, which implies that fixed-effects 
that allow these half-hourly variable costs to change each month of the sample period should provide 
for far more fluctuations in the variable cost of the highest cost unit producing electricity during each 
half-hour of our sample period than is likely to be necessary to capture the amount of variability that 
actually exists in these variable costs. Regressions of model (5.1) including the value of the relevant 
daily fossil fuel price and daily water levels to account for daily changes in the variable cost of 
operating fossil fuel generation units and daily changes in the opportunity cost of water did not 
quantitatively change any of our results. This outcome is not surprising given the high level of 
agreement between our estimates of βj and δj using day-of-sample and half-hour-of-the-day fixed-
effects and different half-hour-of-the-day fixed effects for each month of the sample period. 
Table 5.1 presents the estimated values of βj and δj and the estimated standard errors for each of the 
four suppliers using the day-of-sample and half-hour-of-the-day fixed-effects. Table 5.2 presents 
estimates of the same parameter values for the different half-hour-of-the-day fixed effects for each 
month of the sample period. The values of βj and δj are positive, precisely estimated and economically 
meaningful for all regressions. Focusing on the day-of-sample and half-hour-of-the-day fixed-effects 
model, holding all other factors constant, if the residual demand curve faced by Firm C has an inverse 
semi-elasticity that is one unit higher, the offer price associated with the amount of output that it sells 
in the short-term market is predicted to be $1.41/MWh higher, because of the greater ability Firm C 
has to exercise market power implied by the inverse semi-elasticity of its residual demand curve. How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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Table 5.3 computes the half-hourly sample mean and standard deviation of ηjhdm for each h. For 
each supplier, a row of the table is the sample mean and sample standard deviation across all days and 
months of our sample period of the value ηihdm for that half-hour of the day. This table can be used to 
demonstrate the economic significance of our estimates of βj. For example, for Firm C, the standard 
deviation of ηjhdm for h=37 is equal to 6.811. This implies that holding opportunity cost of water and 
the price of the input fossil fuel constant, a one standard deviation change in the value of ηjhdm for half-
hour 37 implies a $9.60/MWh higher offer price and a two standard deviation change a $19.20/MWh 
higher offer price according to the parameter estimates in Table 5.1. For Firm A, the mean and 
variance of the inverse semi-elasticities over the sample period are even higher. The value of βj for 
Firm A implies that a one standard deviation change in the value of the inverse semi-elasticity of its 
residual demand curve during half-hour 23, holding all other factors constant, implies an offer price 
increase of $4.50/MWh. Changes of this magnitude in the value of its inverse semi-elasticity for half-
hour 23 for Firm A during our sample period are not unusual. 
For Firm D the value of β is significantly higher than it is for all of the other suppliers, on the order 
of $3.81/MWh. However, as shown in Table 5.4 the mean value of the inverse semi-elasticity is the 
lowest of all of the suppliers and the variance is also the smallest. Nevertheless, the magnitude of β for 
Firm D implies that even for one standard deviation changes in the value of its inverse semi-elasticity, 
economically significant changes in Firm D’s offer price are predicted to occur because of its 
increased ability to exercise unilateral market power. 
The values of δ, the coefficient associated with η
C
jhdm, the inverse semi-elasticity of the net of 
forward market obligations residual demand curve, are substantially larger in absolute value than the 
corresponding value of β, the coefficient associated with ηjhdm, for all suppliers. The value of δ for Firm 
C implies that if the value of the inverse semi-elasticity of the net forward market obligations residual 
demand curve for Firm C increases by one unit, then Firm C’s offer price for the amount it sells in the 
short-term market is predicted to increase by $4.31 because of the substantially greater incentive Firm 
C has to exercise unilateral market power. Table 5.4 lists the half-hourly sample means and standard 
deviations of η
C
jhdm for each supplier. This table demonstrates that a one unit change in the value of 
η
C
jhdm is a fairly frequent occurrence. For a number of half-hours of the day, a 3 unit change in η
C
jhdm is 
less than a two standard deviation change. For example, during half-hour 37, a two standard deviation 
change in the value of η
C
jhdm implies a more than $20/MWh increase in Firm C’s offer price. 
It is important to emphasize that different from the case of inverse semi-elasticity of the residual 
demand curve, which can only be positive, the inverse semi-elasticity of the net of forward market 
obligations residual demand curve can be negative if the supplier’s fixed-price forward market 
obligations exceed the amount of energy that it sells in the short-term market. As shown in Figure 4.7, 
this was frequently the case for Firm A as well as for Firm B and Firm D during the sample period. 
The results in Table 5.1 for Firm A imply that, keeping all other factors constant, if a negative value of 
η
C
jhdm for Firm A becomes larger in absolute value by one unit, Firm A’s offer price is predicted to be 
$5.08/MWh lower because of its greater incentive to exercise unilateral market power by driving the 
price down. As shown in Table 5.4, a one unit change in η
C
jhdm is less than a one standard deviation 
change for many half-hours of the day. The results in Table 5.1 also imply that, keeping the 
opportunity cost of water and the price of the input fossil fuel constant, if the value of the inverse 
semi-elasticity of the net-of-forward-market-obligations residual demand curve facing Firm A 
increases by one unit, the offer price for the amount of energy it sold in the short-term market is 
$5.08/MWh higher because of the greater incentive Firm A has to exercise unilateral market power. 
Thus, once fixed price forward contract obligations are introduced into a wholesale market, 
suppliers with the ability to exercise unilateral market power can do so either by increasing or 
decreasing prices. A supplier with a substantial ability to exercise unilateral market power that is net 
short relative to its forward market obligations, meaning that it has more fixed-price forward market 
obligations than the amount of energy it sold in the short-term market, has an incentive to exercise 
market power by driving down the wholesale price, which reduces the cost of closing out its net short Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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position through purchases from the short-term market. The results shown in Table 5.1 confirm this 
for logic for all suppliers. Alternatively, when a supplier is long relative to its forward market position, 
meaning that its sales in the short-term market exceed its fixed-price forward market obligations, a 
higher value of the η
C
jhdm implies that it will raise its offer price because it has an incentive to use its 
ability to exercise market power to raise the market-clearing price. 
The estimate for δj for Firm D is by far the largest of the five values reported in Table 5.1. 
However, as shown in Table 5.4 the standard deviations of the inverse elasticity of the net of fixed-
price forward market obligations for Firm D are very small in absolute value relative to the values for 
the other three suppliers. Nevertheless, even multiplying the estimate of δj for Firm D by a one 
standard deviation change in the value of its inverse elasticity yields predicted offer price changes of 
more than $10/MWh for many half-hours of the day. Because the η
C
jhdm for Firm D takes on both 
positive and negative values during the sample period, there are times when Firm D submits a 
substantially lower offer price, all other factors held constant, because it has an incentive to use its 
ability to influence market prices to lower the market-clearing price because its short-term market 
sales are less than its forward market obligations. Alternatively, when it is long relative to its forward 
market position, a higher value of the η
C
jhdm for Firm D implies that it will raise its offer price because 
it has an incentive to use its ability to exercise market power to raise the market-clearing price. 
It is important to emphasize that the goal of our modeling effort is to determine whether higher 
offer prices are systematically associated with higher values of ηjhdm and η
C
jhdm and whether the 
magnitude of this relationship is economically significant. The results of our analysis presented in 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide strong confirmation of a positive and economically significant relationship 
between a supplier’s half-hourly offer price and the half-hourly values of ηjhdm and η
C
jhdm.  The 
magnitude of this relationship is substantially larger for the measure of the incentive to exercise 
unilateral market power relative to the measure of the ability to exercise unilateral market power. This 
result is consistent with the logic in Section 3 that a supplier with the ability to exercise unilateral 
market power must also have the incentive to do so in order to find it expected profit-maximizing to 
submit offer prices that exploit it. 
It is important to emphasize that the regressions (5.1) and (5.2) are predictive regressions in the 
sense discussed in Reiss and Wolak (2007). As noted above, the economic theory of expected profit-
maximizing offer behaviour described in Wolak (2003a, and 2007) does not imply these regressions 
yield the precise causal relationship between half-hourly offer prices and the half-hourly indexes of the 
ability and incentive of market participants to exercise unilateral market power. This fact does not 
invalidate the interpretation of these regressions as providing predictive statistical evidence consistent 
with the view that after controlling for the level of input fossil fuel prices and the opportunity cost of 
water, when any of the four suppliers has a greater ability or incentive to exercise unilateral power 
market power as measured by these indexes, each supplier submits a significantly higher half-hourly 
offer price and this higher offer price results in substantially higher market-clearing price. 
6. Analysis with Pivotal Measures of the Ability and Incentive to Exercise Market Power 
We now present an analysis of the relationship between a supplier’s offer price and indexes of the 
ability and incentive to exercise market power based whether the supplier is pivotal and net pivotal as 
defined in Section 3. Although there is no simple relationship between a supplier’s offer price and its 
status as a pivotal supplier or net pivotal supplier that can be derived from the assumption of expected 
profit-maximizing offer behaviour, periods when a supplier expects it is pivotal or net pivotal are 
likely to cause it to raise its offer price, particularly for the pivotal quantity of energy. In fact, a 
number of the market power mitigation mechanisms in United States wholesale markets are based on 
this supposition. The short-term market operator takes the offers and bids of all market participants 
and determines whether a supplier is pivotal or a set of suppliers are jointly pivotal. If this is the case 
then the offers of this supplier or this set of suppliers are mitigated to some reference offer level that is How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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based on that supplier’s variable cost of production. Our analysis tests whether suppliers recognize 
that an increased likelihood of being pivotal or net pivotal causes them to raise their offer prices. 
Recall that supplier j is pivotal during half-hour h of day d of month m if its residual demand is 
positive for all finite prices. Define the indicator variable Pivjhdm to equal 1 if supplier j is pivotal 
during half-hour h of day d of month m and zero otherwise. A related measure of the ability of 
supplier j to exercise unilateral market power is the pivotal quantity of energy for supplier j, which is 
the maximum of zero and the residual demand of supplier j evaluated at the highest observed offer 
during that half-hour period, pmax. If DRjhdm(pmax) is the value of the residual demand curve at pmax for 
supplier j during half-hour h of day d of month m, then the value of the pivotal quantity PQuantjhdm 
equals max(0, DRjhdm(pmax)). Note that when supplier j is not pivotal the value of the pivotal quantity is 
zero and when the supplier is pivotal the value of PQuantjhdm equals DRjhdm(pmax). 
The analogous measure of the incentive of a supplier to exercise unilateral market power is the 
indicator variable for whether a supplier is net pivotal meaning that the pivotal quantity for that 
supplier exceeds its fixed-price forward market obligation. If QCjhdm is supplier j’s fixed-price forward 
market obligation in half-hour period h of day d and month m, then if DRjhdm(pmax) is greater than 
QCjhdm, the supplier is deemed to be net pivotal. Define the indicator variable NPivjhdm to equal 1 if 
supplier j is net pivotal during half-hour h of day d of month m and zero otherwise. The second 
measure of the incentive to exercise unilateral market power is net pivotal quantity, which is defined 
as maximum of zero and the difference between the pivotal quantity and the supplier’s fixed-price 
forward market obligation. Define NPQuantjhdm, the net pivotal quantity for supplier j during half-hour 
h of day d of month m as max(0, DRjhdm(pmax) - QCjhdm). If supplier j is not net pivotal then the value of 
NPQuantjhdm is equal to zero and if the supplier is net pivotal then NPQuantjhdm = DRjhdm(pmax) - 
QCjhdm. 
Table 6.1 presents summary statistics on pivotal indicator and net pivotal indicator variables for 
each year of our sample period from January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007. Firm A has by far the highest 
pivotal and net pivotal frequency. For all but 2001, it is pivotal in more than 50 percent of the half-
hour periods of the year. Next is Firm C with annual pivotal frequencies that range from 10 to 20 
percent. Firm B’s annual pivotal frequency ranges from slightly more than 3 percent to slightly more 
than 10 percent. Firm D has the lowest annual pivotal frequency of the four suppliers. It is important to 
note that one supplier being pivotal or net pivotal during a half-hour period does not preclude other 
suppliers from being pivotal or net pivotal during this same half-hour period. Typically, when one 
large supplier is pivotal or net pivotal, other suppliers are as well. 
Table 6.1 shows that for all suppliers but Firm A, being net pivotal is an extremely rare event. For 
all but 2001 for Firm A, the net pivotal percentage never exceeds one percent. For most of the years of 
the sample, the remaining suppliers are never net pivotal during any half-hour of the year. Firm B and 
Firm C are net pivotal only in 2001 and Firm C’s net pivotal frequency is less than one-tenth that of 
Firm B. Therefore, we would not recommend putting much weight on the net pivotal regression results 
for Firm C because it is net pivotal for such a small number of half-hours during the sample period. 
Table 6.2 presents linear regressions of the offer price at the supplier’s dispatched quantity of 
energy on these two indicators of the ability of the supplier to exercise unilateral market power and the 
two indicators of the incentive of the supplier to exercise unilateral market power. All of these 
regressions include day-of-sample and half-hour-of-the-day fixed-effects similar to the regressions 
presented in Table 5.1. Table 6.3 presents linear regressions of the half-hourly offer price on half-
hourly values of these same four variables with half-hour-of-the-day fixed-effects for each month of 
the sample similar to the regressions presented in Table 5.2. For all suppliers and all measures (except 
for the net pivotal dummy and net pivotal quantity for Firm C in Table 6.2), we find that a higher 
ability and incentive to exercise unilateral market power as measured by respectively, the pivotal 
indicator variable and pivotal quantity and net pivotal indicator and net pivotal quantity, predict higher 
offer prices for the supplier’s dispatched quantity of energy.  Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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Although the point estimates for Firm C in Table 6.2 for the net pivotal dummy and net pivotal 
quantity coefficients are negative, they are not statistically different from zero, which is to be expected 
given the near-zero frequency that Firm C is net pivotal during our sample period. Although the net 
pivotal dummy and net pivotal quantity parameter estimates for Firm C in Table 6.3 are both positive, 
they are not statistically different from zero, which provides further evidence that the near-zero 
frequency that Firm C is net pivotal during our sample period makes it impossible to estimate these 
coefficients with any degree of precision. 
  The estimates in Table 6.2 imply that keeping water levels and input fossil fuel prices 
constant, if Firm A is pivotal then the offer price for its dispatched quantity is expected to be $12.45 
higher. For Firm C this corresponding figure is $11.40. According to Table 6.2, being pivotal is 
predicted to increase a supplier’s offer price by at least $10.22, the coefficient estimate for Firm B. For 
all suppliers the coefficient on the pivotal quantity is also positive and precisely estimated. For 
example, a 50 MW pivotal quantity for Firm A implies a roughly $1.00 higher offer price. For Firm C 
this same pivotal quantity of energy implies a $1.65 higher offer price. 
For the net pivotal indicator, the predicted offer price increases are much larger for two of the four 
firms and the predicted increase in the offer price for a net pivotal quantity change is an order of 
magnitude larger for two of these firms. For Firm B, being net pivotal predicts a $67.58 increase in its 
offer price and for Firm D being net pivotal implies a $220.40 increase in its offer price. For Firm A, a 
20 MW net pivotal quantity predicts a $1.56 higher offer price and for Firm B a 20 MW net pivotal 
quantity predicts a $10.22 higher offer price. These net pivotal results should be interpreted with 
caution for all suppliers but Firm A because of the very small number of net pivotal events during the 
sample period for the remaining suppliers. Despite the very infrequent occurrence of being net pivotal 
for Firm B and Firm D, different from Firm C, these regressions yield precise estimates that imply 
these suppliers will adjust their price offers upward by economically meaningful magnitudes when 
they are net pivotal and increasingly so the larger is their net pivotal quantity. 
These regression results and the results presented in Table 5.1 and 5.2 provide strong evidence that 
the higher market prices that occur when the four large suppliers have a greater unilateral ability and 
incentive to exercise market power, as shown in Figures 4.5 and 4.9, is due to the fact that these 
suppliers submit higher offer prices in order to raise market prices. In addition, when these suppliers 
have a substantial ability to exercise market power and have an incentive to exercise market power by 
lowering their offer price, they also do so. Taken together, the empirical evidence presented in this 
section suggests a causal link between the unilateral ability and incentive of suppliers to exercise 
market power and the offer prices they submit for the quantity of energy they sell in the short-term 
market. These higher or lower offer prices produce higher or lower market-clearing prices that are 
consistent with the unilateral ability and incentive of suppliers to exercise market power. 
7. Do Thermal Suppliers Behave as if They Have No Ability to Exercise Market Power? 
The final piece of evidence in favor of the view that the four large suppliers exercise all available 
unilateral market power is a test of the null hypothesis that suppliers behave as if they had no ability or 
incentive to exercise unilateral market power. As discussed in Section 3, a supplier that has no ability 
or incentive to exercise unilateral market power can be expected to submit an offer curve equal to its 
aggregate marginal cost curve of supplying electricity. The complication with implementing this test 
for hydroelectric suppliers is that estimating their no-market-power opportunity cost of supplying 
energy is a massively complex computational problem. However, for fossil fuel suppliers we know 
that the opportunity cost of producing electricity from their generation units depends on the price of 
the input fossil fuel, the heat rate of the generation unit and the variable operating and maintenance 
cost of the generation unit. Consequently, as demonstrated in Section 3, a fossil fuel supplier with no 
ability to exercise unilateral market power will submit an offer price for each fossil generation unit 
equal to the unit’s variable cost. How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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Our test of the null hypothesis that no supplier has the ability or incentive to exercise unilateral 
market power is based on the simple insight that offer prices of fossil fuel generation unit owners with 
no ability to exercise unilateral market power should not be predicted by any other factors besides 
those that impact the variable cost of the generation unit. In particular, if fossil fuel suppliers do not 
have any ability to exercise unilateral market power, the offer price for the amount of energy they sell 
into the short-term market should not be impacted by the system hydro storage level. In contrast, if 
higher offer prices are associated with lower water levels, then this is consistent with a supplier that 
has the ability to exercise unilateral market power taking advantage of this fact to raise their offer 
prices and market-clearing prices in response to the incentives that it faces. 
To investigate this null hypothesis we regress the offer price for the quantity of energy sold from 
each fossil fuel generation unit during the half-hour periods of sample when the unit was available to 
supply energy on a number of factors that control for the variable cost of producing electricity from 
this generation unit at different levels of output and daily level hydro storage in Terawatt-hours 
(TWh). Let Pkhdm(offer) equal the offer price of the energy sold in the short-term market from fossil 
fuel generation unit k during half-hour h of day d and month m. Let Hydrodm equal the amount of 
hydroelectric energy in storage on day d of month m. Let QINCikdhm equal a set of I(k) dummy 
variables each of which equals 1 if the dispatch quantity from fossil fuel generation unit k during half-
hour h of day d in month m lies in the 10 MW quantity increment i. For each generation unit we take 
the maximum and minimum output observed during the sample period and divide this range into 10 
MW increments. For example, if 250 MW is the lowest output level and 360 MW is highest output 
level, then I(k) equals 11, meaning that there are 11 possible 10 MW bins that the supplier could 
produce in during the sample period. These quantity bins are chosen to account for the fact that the 
heat rate of fossil fuel units can be different for different output levels. Define YRzdhm as an indicator 
variable that equals one if half-hour h of day d and month of sample m is in year z, where 
z=2001,2002,…2007. Define MTHwdhm as an indicator variable that equals 1 if half-hour h of day d 
and month-of-sample m is in month-of-the-year w=1,2,3…,12. We estimate the following regression 
for each fossil fuel unit: 
   (7.1) 
 
This linear regression controls for differences in the variable cost of fossil fuel units across the 10 MW 
quantity increments of output levels for the unit (the first summation), across each year of the sample 
(the second and third summations), and within the months of the year (the fourth summation) in order 
to assess whether the level of hydroelectric storage provides incremental explanatory power, beyond 
these variables that control for differences in the generation unit’s variable cost of production, in 
predicting the offer price. 
Table 7.1 presents the results of estimating (7.1) for the major fossil fuel units (or, in one case, 
group of units) operating in the New Zealand market during our sample period. In all cases, the 
estimated value of βk, the coefficient associated with the value of system hydro storage for unit k, is 
found to be negative and precisely estimated. The null hypothesis that βk is equal to zero is 
overwhelmingly rejected for all eight units, which provides strong evidence against the null hypothesis 
that the owners of these fossil fuel units behave as if they had no ability to exercise unilateral market 
power. The implied change in offer behaviour from these generation units as a result of changes in the 
water level are also economically meaningful. For example, if the value of system hydro storage 
decreases by 1 TWh, then the offer price for the Plant 6 is predicted to increase by $24.31 and by 
$24.12 for the Plant 8. The predicted increases in the offer prices for a 1 TWh reduction in the value of Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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system hydro storage for Plant 5 and Plant 7 are roughly half these values. Plant 1 and Plant 3 have 
predicted offer price increases for a 1 TWh reduction in system hydro storage of $17.40 and $19.61, 
respectively. Note that the difference between the minimum and maximum system hydro storage 
levels during our sample period is 3.1 TWh, so these estimates predict very large changes in the offer 
prices of fossil fuel units for the observed changes in hydrological conditions. 
Although these parameter estimates are inconsistent with the hypothesis that these fossil fuel 
generation unit owners have no ability to exercise unilateral market power, the signs and magnitudes 
of the estimated values of the βk are consistent with the hypothesis that the owners of these generation 
units have a significant ability to exercise unilateral market power and that this ability to exercise 
unilateral market power increases with the level of system hydro storage. These results are also 
consistent with the results presented in the previous section which showed that the offer price for the 
quantity of energy sold in the short-term market by each of the four suppliers is increasing in that 
supplier’s ability and incentive to exercise unilateral market power. 
8. Conclusions about How Firms Exercise Market Power 
The three lines of empirical inquiry presented in this paper are broadly consistent with the implications 
of expected profit-maximizing offer behaviour by the four large suppliers in response to the extent of 
competition they face from other suppliers on a half-hourly basis. This conclusion does not depend on 
any assumptions about the functional form of aggregate demand in the market or any model of 
strategic interaction among firms. Because of the data-rich multi-unit auction environment that we 
study, ex post half-hourly measures of the ability of a supplier to exercise market power using the 
offers submitted by all suppliers and the level of system demand can be computed without either of 
these assumptions. We find that each of the four large suppliers submits a higher half-hourly offer 
price when it has a higher half-hourly unilateral ability to exercise market power. The half-hourly offer 
price increases predicted by the parameter estimates from our econometric model for typical changes 
in the half-hourly ability of each supplier to exercise market power are economically significant in the 
sense that the implied offer price increases can be in the range of $10/MWh to $20/MWh during peak 
periods of the day. 
We find even larger (in absolute value) predicted changes in a supplier’s half-hourly offer prices in 
response to changes in its half-hourly incentive to exercise market power for typical changes in the 
values of these indexes. Our index of the half-hourly incentive of a supplier to exercise market power 
can be positive or negative, depending on the supplier’s exposure to short-term market-clearing price 
during that half-hour period. If a supplier is net long—its short-term market sales exceed its fixed-
price forward market obligations for that half-hour—then its index of the incentive to exercise market 
power is positive. If a supplier is short—its sales are less than its fixed-price forward market 
obligations for that half-hour—then its index of the incentive to exercise market power is negative. 
Our regression results predict that sizeable increases in the supplier’s offer price occur during half-
hour periods when this index of the supplier’s incentive to exercise market power is large and positive 
and sizeable decreases in the supplier’s offer prices occur during the half-hour periods when this half-
hourly index of the supplier’s the incentive to exercise market power is large in absolute value and 
negative. These results emphasize that the extent a supplier actually exploits a lower degree of 
competition from other firms depends on the incentive it has to do so, as measured by the degree to 
which the revenues the supplier receives depends on the short-term market-clearing price. In addition, 
how the supplier exploits its ability to influence the short-term market price depends on the sign of its 
exposure to short-market prices. This result implies that a portion of the high degree of volatility in 
half-hourly short-term wholesale electricity prices is the result of changes in the sign of the half-hourly 
incentive of suppliers to exercise unilateral market power. 
These relationships between the half-hourly ability and incentive of suppliers to exercise market 
power and the offer price than they submit also hold for half-hourly indexes of the ability and How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? 
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incentive to exercise market power based on the pivotal and net supplier concept. Sizeable offer price 
increases are predicted for each of the suppliers during the half-hour periods when they are pivotal. 
Finally, we provide strong evidence against the null hypothesis that the half-hourly offer curves 
submitted by owners of fossil fuel generation units are the result of those suppliers behaving as if they 
have no ability to exercise market power.  
Taken together, the empirical results in this paper demonstrate that although prices in a multi-unit 
auction wholesale electricity market depend on supply and demand conditions, actual supply 
conditions depend on the offer curves submitted by market participants to the wholesale market. These 
offer curves are direct result of the unilateral expected profit-maximizing actions of suppliers given 
factors that they are unable to control such as the level of demand at all locations in the New Zealand, 
amount of water inflows to hydroelectric generation units and the price of fossil fuels and other inputs 
consumed to produce electricity. Therefore, the ability and incentive of large suppliers to exercise 
unilateral market power are important determinants of the supply conditions that determine short-term 
wholesale prices, even after the impact of exogenous factors such as water availability and fossil fuel 
prices have been taken into account. Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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Table 4.1: Correlation between semi-elasticity results for different price windows 
Price window  15%  10%  5% 1% 15% 10%  5%  1%
15%  1.00  1.00
10%  0.96  1.00  0.96 1.00 
5%  0.88  0.92  1.00 0.92 0.96  1.00 
1%  0.81  0.85  0.93 1.00 0.82 0.85  0.90  1.00
Mean semi-elasticity  2.05  2.07  2.07 1.99 0.88 0.88  0.86  0.83
Price window  15%  10%  5% 1% 15% 10%  5%  1%
15%  1.00  1.00
10%  0.95  1.00  0.97 1.00 
5%  0.90  0.95  1.00 0.91 0.94  1.00 
1%  0.84  0.90  0.94 1.00 0.85 0.88  0.94  1.00
Mean semi-elasticity  1.27  1.28  1.25 1.21 0.73 0.74  0.75  0.74
Firm A
Firm D  Firm C
Firm B Shaun D. McRae and Frank A. Wolak 
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Table 5.1: Dependent variable = offer price at dispatch quantity for supplier j 
Firm AF i r m  BF i r m  CF i r m  D
βj 0.46 0.56 1.41 3.81
(s.e.) (.017) (.040) (.031) (.062)
δj 5.08 4.02 4.31 21.63
(s.e.) (.108) (.146) (.101) (.335)
 
Note: Day-of-sample and half-hour fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
 
Table 5.2: Dependent variable = offer price at dispatch quantity for supplier j 
Firm AF i r m  BF i r m  CF i r m  D
βj 0.67 0.73 1.16 4.54
(s.e.) (.020) (.040) (.029) (.064)
δj 7.27 3.39 3.38 22.86
(s.e.) (.129) (.154) (.092) (.354)
 
Note: Month-of-sample interacted with half-hour fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
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Table 5.3: Half-hourly summary statistics for ηi by firm 
Half‐hour
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
1 1.541 2.636 0.644 2.079 0.993 2.420 0.416 0.913
2 1.429 2.530 0.587 1.276 0.975 2.807 0.339 0.640
3 1.447 2.410 0.584 1.416 0.888 2.035 0.310 0.608
4 1.351 2.166 0.533 0.921 0.822 1.483 0.287 0.585
5 1.412 2.474 0.526 1.054 0.813 1.511 0.289 0.659
6 1.409 2.594 0.505 0.962 0.860 1.991 0.281 0.613
7 1.333 2.322 0.509 1.620 0.800 2.455 0.279 0.643
8 1.333 2.318 0.472 0.799 0.789 1.468 0.278 0.621
9 1.333 2.491 0.486 0.965 0.748 1.218 0.275 0.588
10 1.348 2.354 0.456 0.687 0.761 1.422 0.269 0.546
11 1.342 2.285 0.501 1.107 0.780 1.634 0.288 0.642
12 1.393 2.723 0.587 1.993 0.882 2.444 0.311 0.698
13 1.445 2.627 0.654 1.669 0.939 2.496 0.364 0.699
14 1.584 3.191 0.688 1.210 1.137 3.897 0.485 1.028
15 1.917 4.402 0.882 2.197 1.409 5.288 0.760 2.667
16 2.418 6.425 1.229 6.171 1.589 4.039 1.045 3.220
17 2.570 7.223 1.194 5.489 1.537 3.994 1.057 4.789
18 2.463 6.399 1.134 3.108 1.622 4.799 1.066 4.715
19 2.372 5.881 1.120 4.086 1.501 4.333 0.968 2.636
20 2.300 5.690 1.161 4.631 1.526 4.469 0.926 2.268
21 2.364 6.734 1.068 3.243 1.442 3.706 0.958 2.774
22 2.479 6.608 0.997 2.816 1.487 4.349 0.942 2.420
23 2.677 9.769 1.004 2.491 1.549 4.374 0.988 2.709
24 2.668 9.224 1.008 2.480 1.647 5.656 0.970 2.493
25 2.366 6.058 0.999 3.021 1.562 5.810 0.924 2.770
26 2.458 6.747 1.043 4.225 1.486 4.647 0.920 2.844
27 2.348 5.341 0.962 3.524 1.408 3.411 0.872 2.338
28 2.319 6.026 0.967 3.707 1.402 3.847 0.851 2.302
29 2.198 5.043 0.890 2.019 1.322 3.034 0.852 2.471
30 2.247 6.291 0.965 3.881 1.305 3.477 0.834 2.532
31 2.293 6.303 0.933 3.261 1.366 4.191 0.817 2.341
32 2.254 5.510 0.951 3.088 1.394 3.937 0.839 2.179
33 2.263 4.978 0.877 1.713 1.402 3.845 0.850 2.437
34 2.318 5.427 0.974 3.242 1.437 4.428 0.896 2.420
35 2.375 4.528 1.057 2.809 1.445 3.843 0.954 2.619
36 2.853 6.571 1.364 4.375 1.823 4.874 1.257 4.240
37 2.712 5.981 1.301 4.435 1.989 6.811 1.241 3.660
38 2.672 5.361 1.191 2.690 1.784 5.458 1.186 3.423
39 2.599 6.263 1.203 3.762 1.687 5.058 1.168 3.888
40 2.454 6.112 1.079 2.861 1.435 3.618 1.023 3.723
41 2.448 6.388 1.082 3.108 1.452 4.059 1.042 4.053
42 2.402 5.690 1.060 2.568 1.482 4.036 0.954 2.524
43 2.242 4.855 0.954 2.347 1.298 3.253 0.884 2.194
44 2.218 5.787 0.894 3.299 1.298 4.765 0.768 2.229
45 2.093 4.885 0.831 2.304 1.148 2.636 0.656 1.630
46 1.747 2.897 0.694 1.501 0.977 1.843 0.511 0.988
47 1.758 3.442 0.715 2.311 0.990 1.962 0.562 1.765
48 1.705 4.103 0.613 1.365 0.917 2.047 0.419 1.073
Firm C Firm B Firm A Firm D
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Table 5.4: Half-hourly summary statistics for ηi
C by firm 
Half‐hour
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
1 0.029 0.356 0.143 0.632 0.346 1.020 ‐0.029 0.290
2 ‐0.010 0.415 0.142 0.518 0.354 1.086 ‐0.033 0.242
3 ‐0.033 0.348 0.145 0.586 0.333 0.822 ‐0.028 0.222
4 ‐0.055 0.345 0.132 0.459 0.315 0.676 ‐0.022 0.189
5 ‐0.061 0.410 0.130 0.577 0.314 0.667 ‐0.022 0.194
6 ‐0.062 0.431 0.125 0.508 0.346 1.004 ‐0.028 0.189
7 ‐0.077 0.401 0.126 0.981 0.311 1.020 ‐0.023 0.206
8 ‐0.084 0.406 0.099 0.266 0.308 0.638 ‐0.028 0.209
9 ‐0.087 0.414 0.099 0.308 0.290 0.519 ‐0.026 0.163
10 ‐0.083 0.401 0.093 0.274 0.295 0.604 ‐0.024 0.173
11 ‐0.066 0.359 0.101 0.569 0.298 0.706 ‐0.019 0.177
12 ‐0.044 0.364 0.111 0.761 0.332 0.961 ‐0.030 0.191
13 0.010 0.379 0.131 0.856 0.333 0.962 ‐0.010 0.188
14 0.045 0.445 0.112 0.468 0.358 1.281 0.006 0.213
15 0.100 0.594 0.127 0.623 0.401 1.516 0.050 0.416
16 0.236 0.834 0.180 1.151 0.410 1.341 0.117 0.652
17 0.293 1.036 0.132 0.980 0.366 1.196 0.115 0.556
18 0.299 1.033 0.137 0.822 0.386 1.527 0.122 0.584
19 0.276 0.910 0.130 0.737 0.347 1.168 0.110 0.446
20 0.259 0.778 0.119 0.672 0.357 1.273 0.100 0.413
21 0.272 0.821 0.121 0.677 0.347 1.085 0.094 0.440
22 0.274 1.003 0.129 0.716 0.370 1.537 0.092 0.366
23 0.311 1.087 0.102 0.686 0.385 1.255 0.097 0.427
24 0.324 1.187 0.092 0.796 0.418 1.803 0.085 0.412
25 0.295 1.038 0.113 0.914 0.381 1.543 0.078 0.568
26 0.306 1.147 0.110 0.940 0.362 1.143 0.070 0.502
27 0.303 1.121 0.104 0.871 0.343 0.956 0.071 0.378
28 0.272 0.938 0.106 0.895 0.359 1.199 0.061 0.423
29 0.245 0.769 0.107 0.793 0.354 0.984 0.052 0.379
30 0.243 0.992 0.099 0.927 0.356 1.168 0.039 0.390
31 0.242 0.957 0.105 0.838 0.377 1.427 0.040 0.335
32 0.269 0.976 0.097 0.856 0.361 1.119 0.051 0.312
33 0.265 0.912 0.094 0.705 0.372 1.193 0.057 0.294
34 0.311 1.002 0.077 0.640 0.359 1.229 0.071 0.364
35 0.324 0.734 0.109 1.019 0.349 1.113 0.095 0.479
36 0.454 1.466 0.170 1.381 0.421 1.415 0.155 0.842
37 0.417 1.067 0.142 1.304 0.479 2.335 0.165 0.760
38 0.392 0.947 0.145 1.089 0.413 1.495 0.152 0.793
39 0.350 1.056 0.140 1.226 0.395 1.329 0.145 0.777
40 0.296 1.031 0.135 1.198 0.351 1.074 0.113 0.580
41 0.300 0.990 0.116 0.989 0.355 1.198 0.112 0.653
42 0.293 0.960 0.117 0.904 0.366 1.208 0.082 0.482
43 0.278 0.805 0.109 0.795 0.335 1.003 0.068 0.361
44 0.228 0.764 0.086 0.574 0.363 1.612 0.048 0.380
45 0.185 0.753 0.135 1.378 0.350 0.954 0.008 0.296
46 0.091 0.549 0.120 0.836 0.318 0.715 ‐0.017 0.265
47 0.115 0.496 0.125 1.001 0.291 0.716 0.008 0.448
48 0.068 0.574 0.127 0.686 0.304 0.875 ‐0.040 0.568
Firm C Firm B Firm A Firm D
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Table 6.1: Summary statistics for pivotal variables 
Firm AF i r m  BF i r m  CF i r m  D
Gross pivotal
2001 49.1% 4.7% 13.8% 2.7%
2002 61.2% 10.4% 12.9% 5.2%
2003 52.9% 4.6% 17.6% 1.4%
2004 60.9% 10.2% 20.2% 5.4%
2005 53.5% 3.4% 17.0% 1.2%
2006 52.4% 6.1% 16.6% 1.7%
2007 51.2% 4.1% 13.2% 0.6%
Net pivotal
2001 2.25% 0.43% 0.02% ‐
2002 0.67% ‐‐ 0.02%




2007 ‐‐‐‐  
 
 
Table 6.2: Dependent variable = offer price at dispatch quantity for supplier j 
Regression on: Firm AF i r m  BF i r m  CF i r m  D
(a)  Pivotal dummy (0/1) 12.45 10.22 11.40 16.07
        (s.e.) (.267) (.491) (.331) (.903)
(b)  Pivotal quantity (MW) 0.020 0.034 0.033 0.086
        (s.e.) (.0004) (.0018) (.0010) (.0049)
(c)  Net pivotal dummy (0/1) 10.62 67.58 ‐16.62 220.4
        (s.e.) (1.09) (4.02) (15.92) (16.03)
(d)  Net pivotal quantity (MW) 0.078 0.511 ‐0.093 1.642
        (s.e.) (.007) (.032) (.312) (.133)
Note: Day-of-sample and half-hour fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
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Table 6.3: Dependent variable = offer price at dispatch quantity for supplier j 
Regression on: Firm AF i r m  BF i r m  CF i r m  D
(a)  Pivotal dummy (0/1) 17.37 13.68 14.33 24.34
        (s.e.) (.310) (.544) (.322) (.993)
(b)  Pivotal quantity (MW) 0.030 0.048 0.047 0.135
        (s.e.) (.0004) (.0020) (.0011) (.0055)
(c)  Net pivotal dummy (0/1) 19.37 70.35 5.76 259.7
        (s.e.) (1.36) (4.32) (15.68) (17.13)
(d)  Net pivotal quantity (MW) 0.122 0.585 0.350 1.937
        (s.e.) (.008) (.035) (.307) (.143)
Note: Month-of-sample interacted with half-hour fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
 
Table 7.1: Dependent variable = offer price at dispatch quantity for fossil fuel plant/unit 
k 
Plant 1P l a n t  2P l a n t  3P l a n t  4
βk ‐17.40 ‐2.34 ‐19.61 ‐21.13
(s.e.) (.457) (.135) (.340) (.448)
Plant 5P l a n t  6P l a n t  7P l a n t  8
βk ‐8.05 ‐24.31 ‐11.01 ‐24.12
(s.e.) (.674) (.377) (.459) (.335)
Note: Regressions include year-of-sample fixed effects interacted with generation quantity in 10MW bins, as 
well as month-of-year fixed effects. The dependent variable in each regression is the offer price from either a 
single generation unit, or a group of units. 
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